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I. INTRODUCTION
The world of professional sports is experiencing a plague of
athletes using performance-enhancing drugs (PEDs). Problems with
PEDs have arisen in many sports, including sports connected with the
Olympics, professional cycling at the Tour de France, professional foot-
ball in the United States, and Major League Baseball in North and Latin
America. Reactions from bodies responsible for overseeing these sports
demonstrate the seriousness of the PED problem. Perhaps the best-
known entity involved in trying to eliminate PEDs from sports is the
World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA),1 the very name of which indicates
the global scope of the problem.
Much of the attention the PED problem garners in national and
international media centers on famous, high-profile professional athletes,
who are accused of competing unfairly by using PEDs. This phenome-
non has been particularly true with respect to the PED-related contro-
versies in Major League Baseball (MLB).2 One former major league
player admitted using steroids when he won a Most Valuable Player
award,3 and another major league player published a sensationalized, but
I World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), http://www.wada-ama.org/en/.
2 See, e.g., HOWARD BRYANT, JUICING THE GAME: DRUGS, POWER, AND THE
FIGHT FOR THE SOUL OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (2006).
3 Tom Verducci, Caminiti Comes Clean: Ex-MVP Says He Won Award While
Using Steroids, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 3, 2002, at 36.
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still significant book alleging widespread PED use in MLB.4 Congress
has held hearings on MLB's PED problem, 5 and allegations of PED use
have shredded the reputations of some of the most famous MLB players,
such as Mark McGwire, Rafael Palmeiro, Sammy Sosa,6 and Barry
Bonds.7
However, the focus on the most famous, most high-profile ath-
letes obscures the true extent of the PED problem. Such athletes have
succeeded in reaching the top levels of their respective sports and, thus,
attract the lion's share of the media spotlight. Beneath the glitter of the
top levels of most professional sports is an entirely different world where
4 See, e.g., JOSE CANSECO, JUICED: WILD TIMES, RAMPANT 'ROIDS, SMASH
HITS, AND How BASEBALL GOT BIG (2005). Canseco's book played a role in the
willingness of Congress to convene hearings in 2005 and, according to James
Nafziger, "[t]he Canseco book ... stimulated additional testing, leading to the
revelation that star first baseman Rafael Palmeiro had tested positive." James A.
R. Nafziger, Doping and the Globalization of Baseball, in LEGAL ISSUES IN
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL 187, 194 (L. Kurlantzick ed., 2005).
5 See, e.g., Steroids in Baseball and Amateur Sports: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism of the S. Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2002); Issues Related
to Ephedra-Containing Dietary Supplements: Hearing Before the H.R. Sub-
comm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H.R. Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 108th Cong. (2003); Effectiveness of Drugs Testing and Preventing
Steroid Use: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation, 108th Cong. (2004); Anabolic Steroids Penalties: Hearing Before the
H.R. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H.R.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004); Steroid Use in Sports: Hearing
Before the H.R. Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of
the H.R. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2005); Steroids in
Major League Baseball: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Gov't Reform,
109th Cong. (2005); Steroid Use in Major League Sports: Hearing Before the
H.R. Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. (2005); Federal Drug-Testing
Standards for Professional Athletes: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com-
merce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. (2005).
6 McGwire Mum on Steroids; Sosa, Palmeiro Deny Use in Front of House
Panel, CNN, Mar. 17, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/03/17/
steroids.baseball/.
7 MARK FAINARU-WADA & LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS: BARRY
BONDS, BALCO, & THE STEROID SCANDAL THAT ROCKED PROFESSIONAL
SPORTS (2006).
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younger athletes struggle to enter the top ranks of their sports. Very few
of these young athletes will actually reach the top, making the competi-
tion at the lower levels fierce because the stakes are so high. Not surpri-
singly, the PED problem plagues not only the highest competitive levels
of sports but also the lower rungs, where athletes far from the limelight
dream of the day when they too will enjoy the fame and riches of top-
flight professional athletes.
This article focuses on the PED problem that exists in the Latin
American operations of MLB's minor league system. Our analysis
unfolds in five parts. First, we look at the relationship between the glo-
balization of sports and PED use. Although PED use in sports occurred
well before the current era of globalization, a correlation exists between
the increasing concern with PED use and the globalization of the busi-
ness of sports. In connection with this correlation, we specifically
consider the rise of PED use in MLB as it relates to MLB's strategy of
globalizing the game of baseball. We describe the evolution of MLB's
strategies on PED use, particularly how criticism and pressure forced
MLB to take the PED problem in its Latin American minor league
operations more seriously.
Second, we focus more closely on the problem of PEDs among
players and prospects in MLB's minor league system in Latin America.
This part of the article includes background on the structure and dyna-
mics of MLB's involvement in Latin American countries. This back-
ground is critical to understanding why and how MLB's approach to the
PED problem in its minor league operations differs as between the minor
leagues in the United States and Canada and the minor leagues in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela. Next, we analyze MLB's approach
to the PED problem in its Latin minor league activities. This analysis
includes statistical evidence that provides some sense of the extent of the
PED problem in Latin minor league baseball and the impact the current
drug-testing program has on players from the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela. These statistics reveal that PED use among minor league
players and players who want to sign minor league contracts with MLB
teams is a serious problem that requires heightened attention from MLB.
Third, we examine the problems with how MLB applies its
minor league drug prevention and treatment program in the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela. The approach MLB is taking does not
adequately address the PED problem in these Latin American countries.
[Vol. 15:2
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We also analyze the inadequate efforts made by MLB to implement its
minor league drug prevention and treatment program in the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela.
Fourth, we make recommendations for reforming the way MLB
approaches the fight against doping in its minor league operations in
Latin America. We base these recommendations on five interdependent
reform principles-democratization, centralization, harmonization, spe-
cialization, and implementation-that help structure a more effective and
sustainable strategy for MLB in tackling doping as a problem in its minor
league operations in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.
We conclude by considering recent developments that may
change the structure and dynamics of MLB's approach to the PED prob-
lem in its Latin American operations. Among these developments are the
changes made in U.S. immigration law that affect how MLB brings
minor league players to the United States and concerns about potential
actions of the Venezuelan government. We briefly consider how these
developments enhance or weaken the prospects for a more effective
MLB drug prevention and treatment policy in the Dominican Republic
and Venezuela.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PERFORMANCE-ENHANCING DRUGS
IN GLOBAL SPORTS
A. Performance-Enhancing Drugs and the Globalization of Sports:
Emergence of Global Strategies to Fight Use of PEDs
From the beginning of organized sporting events, athletes have
tried to gain advantages through consumption or use of substances
believed to increase their speed, strength, and/or endurance. The devel-
opment of medical, chemical, and biological sciences in the twentieth
century opened up more possibilities for athletes tempted to use perfor-
mance-enhancing substances. These temptations extended to some
governments, which, during the Cold War, extensively used PEDs to
enhance the performance of their national athletic teams during inter-
national competitions, such as the Olympic Games. Thus, well before the
era of globalization that unfolded after the end of the Cold War, the
problem of PEDs had developed scientific sophistication, international
scope, and political ramifications.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991 influenced politics, economics, business, and culture in
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every realm, which in turn spilled over into the world of sports. The
ideological lines that gave sports nationalistic and geopolitical overtones
(e.g., the Soviet basketball team's win over the United States in the 1972
Summer Olympics and the U.S. hockey team's victory over the Soviets
in the 1980 Winter Olympics) disappeared, radically changing where and
how many sports promoters searched for talent, marketing opportunities,
corporate sponsorships, and consumers.
These structural changes in the politics, economics, business,
and culture of sports stimulated an unprecedented globalization of sports
as social phenomena. Established professional sports, such as North
America's National Hockey League (NHL), moved to exploit talent in
parts of Europe previously isolated behind the Iron Curtain. Other sports,
such as the National Basketball Association (NBA), National Football
League (NFL), and MLB, saw opportunities to expand their efforts into
new regions of the world in order to increase both the sale of their
products and the size of potential labor pools.
Concerns about the use of PEDs by athletes escalated with the
globalization of sports that occurred in the aftermath of the Cold War. As
noted above, athlete use of PEDs had been around in national and inte-
rnational sports for decades, but in the 1990s, concern that the problem
of PEDs was worsening led to new strategies to address it. In 1993, the
World Health Organization (WHO) analyzed the health risks posed by
use of PEDs in sports and "concluded that many of the substances used
have negative health consequences and create a mild to strong
dependence effect upon consumers and that doping should be considered
a public health threat." 8 Concerns about the growing PED problem also
led to the creation in 1999 of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA),
an independent international authority supported by the International
Olympic Committee (IOC) and relevant agencies of national
governments. 9 See Table 1 for WADA's mission and priorities.
8 PAULO DAVID, HUMAN RIGHTS IN YOUTH SPORT 110 (2005).
9 WADA, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/index.ch2.
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Table 1. Mission and Priorities of the World Anti-Doping Agency l
The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is the international independent
organization created in 1999 to promote, coordinate, and monitor the fight
against doping in sport in all its forms.
Composed and funded equally by the sports movement and governments of
the world, WADA coordinated the development and implementation of the
World Anti-Doping Code (Code), the document harmonizing anti-doping
policies in all sports and all countries.
Statutes
WADA is a Swiss private law Foundation. Its seat is in Lausanne,
Switzerland, and its headquarters are in Montreal, Canada.
Vision
WADA works towards a vision of the world that values and fosters doping
free sport.
Priorities
WADA's chief activities focus on seven areas emanating from the respon-
sibilities given to the Agency by the Code and reflect the importance of a
comprehensive approach to the fight against doping in sport:
* Code Adoption, Implementation & Compliance: facilitating sport and
government acceptance of the World Anti-Doping Code (Code) and its prin-
ciples to ensure a harmonized approach to anti-doping in all sports and all
countries; monitoring implementation of and compliance with the Code; wor-
king for the proper adjudication of results
- Science & Medicine: promoting global research to identify and detect
doping substances and methods; developing and maintaining the annual List
of Prohibited Substances and Methods; accrediting anti-doping laboratories
worldwide; monitoring Therapeutic Use Exemptions granted by stakeholders
* Anti-doping Coordination: developing and maintaining the Anti-doping
Development Management System (ADAMS), the web-based database
management system to help stakeholders coordinate anti-doping activities
and comply with the Code
* Anti-Doping Development: facilitating the coordination of Regional Anti-
Doping Organizations by bringing together countries in regions where there
are no or limited anti-doping activities so that they can pool resources to
implement doping control and anti-doping education
10 WADA, Mission & Priorities, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.
ch2?pageCategory.id-255.
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- Education: leading and coordinating effective doping prevention strategies
and education; assisting stakeholders in their implementation of anti-doping
education programs
- Athlete Outreach: educating athletes at major international and multi-sport
events through direct one-on-one interaction with anti-doping experts,
answering their questions about the dangers and consequences of doping;
empowering stakeholders to implement high-impact athlete outreach
programs
- Out-of-competition Testing: contracting with stakeholders to help them
fulfill their responsibility of no-notice out-of-competition testing
One of WADA's most important contributions is the World
Anti-Doping Code, which provides the basis for the harmonization of
anti-doping policies in sports nationally and globally.1' The main
objectives of the Code are to protect the right of athletes to participate in
drug-free sports and to ensure the harmonization and coordination of
effective anti-doping programs in national and international sports.
12
Since its adoption in 2003, hundreds of national and international spor-
ting organizations around the world have adopted the Code,1 3 including
the IOC, the International Paralympic Committee, and international
sporting federations, such as the Frdrration Internationale de Football
Association (FIFA) and the International Basketball Association.
4
Experts consider the Code to be the "gold standard" for anti-doping
programs in sports. 15 The Code has become part of international sports
law and the global lex sportiva because it "provides a process and set of
I WADA, World Anti-Doping Code (2003), www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/
document/code v3.pdf.121d. at 1.
13 WADA, UNESCO International Convention Against Doping in Sports:
Overview, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id-273
("More than 570 sports organizations have already adopted the Code.").
14 WADA, World Anti-Doping Code: Code Acceptance, http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id-270 (list of all organizations that
have accepted the Code).
15 See, e.g., Steroids in Major League Baseball: Hearings Before the H.R.
Comm. on Gov't Reform, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Gary I. Wadler,
Associate Professor, New York University School of Medicine), available at
2005 WL 682056 (calling the World Anti-Doping Code and its related inter-
national standards the "gold standard for anti-doping").
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rules for harmonizing and enforcing a global regime.', 16 The 191
governments that have signed the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-
Doping in Sports, including the United States, Dominican Republic, and
Venezuela, recognize "the role of the Code as the foundation in the
world fight against doping in sport.,
17
The establishment of WADA and the adoption of its Code accel-
erated international cooperation on actions to prevent athlete use of
PEDs, and this cooperation created new treaty law in the anti-doping area
that extends beyond previous regional efforts.18 In 2005, the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
adopted the UNESCO International Convention Against Doping in
Sports, which, as of May 17, 2007, had 52 States Parties.' 9 UNESCO and
WADA are working together to increase participation in this new treaty,
which compliments and supports WADA's activities against use of PEDs
in sports around the world.
B. Performance-Enhancing Drugs and the Globalization
of Baseball: Emergence of Strategies Against PED Use
in the Major and Minor Leagues
The trajectory seen in the development of global governance
strategies against PEDs in the form of WADA and the UNESCO treaty
also appears in MLB in the post-Cold War period, but the path MLB has
taken in regulating PED use differs from the global WADA-led effort.
As with sports generally, concerns about PED use by MLB players
existed before the 1990s, but, over the course of the 1990s and the early
years of the twenty-first century, the problem grew in scope and
16 Nafziger, supra note 4, at 196, 208.
17 Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sports, Mar. 2003, §4.1, http://
www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/copenhagen-en.pdf. For a list of the
191 signatory governments as of August 27, 2007, see WADA, Copenhagen
Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sports:List of Signatories, http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id-391.
18 See, e.g., Council of Europe, Anti-Doping Convention, Nov. 16, 1989,
Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 135, available at http://conventions.
coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/135.htm; Council of Europe, Additional Protocol
to the Anti-Doping Convention, Sept. 12, 2002, Council of Europe Treaty Series
No. 188, available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/188.htm.
19 UNESCO, International Convention Against Doping in Sports: States Parties,
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO-31037&language-E&order-alpha.
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seriousness to the point that MLB as a sport was in a state of crisis. 20 The
congressional hearings on PED use in MLB in 2002 2005 exposed the
crisis, as did the publication of both sensationalistic and investigative
articles and books about the depth of the PED problem in MLB.22
MLB responded to the exposure of the PED crisis by moving,
however reluctantly, towards tougher drug testing programs that would
deter PED use and punish transgressors. MLB previously faced oppo-
sition to more strict PED policies from the Major League Baseball
Players' Association (MLBPA). 23 However, in light of the adverse pub-
licity about the PED problem in MLB and threats of congressional inter-
vention, the MLBPA agreed to work with MLB to create more rigorous
policies on the prevention, treatment, and punishment of PED use.The
foot-dragging caused MLB and the globalization of baseball reputational
damage. Some believe MLB's reluctance to get serious about its PED
problem in a timely way contributed to the IOC's decision to drop
24baseball as an Olympic sport.
20 See Ian O'Connor, Baseball's 'Clean' Superstars Should Demand Random
Drug Testing, USA TODAY, Mar. 6, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.
com/sports/colunmist/oconnor/2004-03-06-oconnor x.htm (referring to MLB's
problems with PEDs as "an Enron-sized scandal threatening to leave baseball in
ruins"); Nafziger, supra note 4, at 188 191 (analyzing the emergence of
"baseball's doping crisis").
21 See sources cited in supra note 5.
22 See, e.g., Verducci, supra note 3; CANSECO, supra note 4; FAINARU-WADA &
WILLIAMS, supra note 7; BRYANT, supra note 2.
23 See, e.g., Steroids in Major League Baseball: Steroids in Major League
Baseball: Hearing Before the HR. Comm. on Gov 't Reform, 109th Cong. (2005)
(testimony of Donald Fehr, Executive Director and General Counsel, Major
League Baseball Players Association) (stating the MLBPA's position "that the
testing of an individual, not because of something he is suspected to have done,
but simply because he is a member of a particular class, is at odds with funda-
mental principles of which we in this country are justifiably proud.").
24 Nafziger, supra note 4, at 188 189 (arguing that baseball's demise as an
Olympic sport partly resulted from MLB's "reputation for turning a blind eye to
its doping problem, which involves an apparent widespread use of performance-
enhancing steroids. It is true, of course, that other sports such as cycling, swim-
ming, and track and field have been seriously tainted by doping, but their
respective sports federations have taken substantial measures to respond to the
problem-generally in conformity with international sports law. . . . The
program MLB finally did establish in 2002 and 2005 is still quite limited. In any
[Vol. 15:2
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The result of the MLB-MLBPA collaboration is Major League
Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program (Major League
Joint DPT Program), which was first adopted by MLB and the MLBPA
and incorporated into their Basic Agreement in August 2002.25 In
November 2005, MLB and the MLBPA reached agreement on a revised
drug program, which included a number of changes, such as tougher
sanctions for violating the ban on use of PEDs. 26 In March 2006, the
revised version of the Major League Joint DPT Program became part of
the latest Basic Agreement, which means that the Program, as revised,
will be in place through 2011, when the current Basic Agreement
expires.
7
In March 2006, the MLB Commissioner appointed former
Senator George Mitchell to investigate PED use in the major leagues and
event, it is reasonable to infer from the IOC decision a direct link between MLB
noncompliance with international anti-doping standards and baseball's demise in
Olympic (and related) competition."). See also WADA at Odds with IBF over
Testing, MLB, (Apr. 5, 2006), http://mlb.mlb.com/content/printer friendly/
mlb/y 2 006/m04/d05/c1384906.jsp (quoting IOC President Jacques Rogge as
stating that "[w]e still have issues about doping [and baseball]. Progress has
been made but not to the level where the Olympic family would accept it.");
WADA, WADA Skeptical about Anti-Doping Policy at World Baseball Classic,
Mar. 16, 2006, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/newsarticle.ch2?articleld-
3115248 (reporting on WADA's serious doubts about whether the anti-doping
policy implemented at the World Baseball Classic by the International Baseball
Federation on behalf of MLB and the MLBPA complied with the World Anti-
Doping Code, a failure that "could further jeopardize the sport's re-entry into the
Olympic program").
21 Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program
(2002) [hereinafter Major League Joint DPT Program (2002)] (on file with
authors).
26 MLBPA Announce New Drug Agreement, MLB, Nov. 15, 2005, http:/
mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/releases/releases.jsp?content- 111505.
27 Major League Baseball's Joint Drug Prevention and Testing Program (2006),
at 23 [hereinafter Major League Joint DPT Program (2006)) (on file with
authors); Barry M. Bloom, MLB, Union Announce New Labor Deal: New Basic
Agreement Will Run through 2011, MLB.coM, (Oct. 25, 2006), http://
mlb.mlb.com/news/article.j sp?ymd-20061024&content id-1722211 &vkey-ps2
006news&fext-.jsp&c id-mlb.
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to propose possible strategies to address the problem.28 However,
Mitchell's investigation is running into various problems, including
objections from the MLBPA and the players individually who object to
Mitchell's requests for medical records and for individual testimony.29
As of this writing, Mitchell has not issued his report to the MLB
Commissioner. 30
Although the controversy concerning PEDs focused on their use
in the major leagues, MLB also had to respond to the threat that PED use
was increasing among minor league players. The PED problem was
systemic, touching not only the superstars in The Show but also players
and prospects seeking to make it to the major leagues. Minor league
players have no union representation in their dealings with MLB teams,
so MLB did not have to contend with a players' union in addressing the
PED problem in the minor leagues. Thus, in 2001, MLB imposed Major
League Baseball's Minor League Drug Prevention and Treatment
Program (Minor League DPT Program) on the minor league operations
of MLB teams in the United States and Canada. MLB issued the latest
version of the Minor League DPT Program in 2007.31
However, MLB did not apply its Minor League DPT Program to
MLB teams' minor league activities in Latin America from 2001 until
2004 (in the Dominican Republic) and 2005 (in Venezuela). This
omission was particularly odd for two reasons.
First, MLB activities in Latin American intensified during the
1990s. MLB teams increased their efforts to recruit baseball talent in
Latin America, especially in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.
28 Mitchell to Head Steroid Investigation, ESPN, Mar. 30, 2006, http://sports.
espn.go.com/ilb/news/story?id-2389391.
29 Duff Wilson, Sosa and Palmeiro Cited in Steroid Investigation, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/sports/baseball/
09steroids.html?ex-1179892800&en-d53bc4bfc9e465af&ei-5070.
30 For a particularly scathing analysis of MLB's response to PED use in the
major leagues, see DICK POUND, INSIDE DOPE: How DRUGS ARE THE BIGGEST
THREAT TO SPORTS, WHY YOU SHOULD CARE, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE
ABOUT THEM 124 137 (2006); Tackling the Problem of Drugs in Baseball,
National Public Radio, June 27, 2007, available at http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyld 11466886 (radio interview with Dick Pound,
Chair of the World Anti-Doping Agency).
31 Major League Baseball's Minor League Drug Prevention and Treatment
Program (2007) [hereinafter Minor League DPT Program] (on file with authors).
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Such intensified interest in the baseball labor pool in Latin America
formed part of MLB's larger strategy of globalizing baseball, a strategy
that found MLB reaching out to potential new markets for fans, tele-
vision revenues, and players. Without question, the Dominican Republic
and Venezuela have long been, and continue to be,32 the best foreign
sources of baseball talent, which led MLB teams to scale up their efforts
to sign Dominican and Venezuelan prospects to minor league contracts.
Second, MLB and MLB teams knew that significant concerns
existed about PED use among prospects and players in these foreign
talent markets. Investigative reporting by Steve Fainaru of the Wash-
ington Post exposed the extent of the Latin PED problem in June 2003,
including deaths of young players who used PEDs 3 Particularly
unsettling was "a disturbing twist to the use of these performance-
enhancing substances: Poor and uneducated Dominican prospects are
increasingly turning to versions designed for animals, according to
dozens of interviews with players, coaches, veterinarians and major
league scouts." 34 This reporting forced MLB to explain why it only
implemented its Minor League DPT Program in the United States,
especially when MLB was aggressively recruiting and training minor
league talent in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.
Initially, MLB gave two reasons why it did not apply the Minor
League DPT Program to its minor league operations in the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela. First, MLB officials indicated that any PED use
by Latin minor league players would be caught when such players
arrived in the minor leagues in the United States, where MLB applied the
Program.35 This reason demonstrated that MLB did not care about PED
use among the vast majority of Latin minor league players and prospects
who would never make the minor leagues in the United States. Second,
MLB argued that implementing a drug-testing program in the Dominican
32 Associated Press, National Pastime Takes on International Flavor, ESPN,
Apr. 3, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id-2824295 (reporting
that 61% of all foreign-born players on major league rosters at the beginning of
the 2007 season came from the Dominican Republic and Venezuela).
33 Steve Fainaru, Injecting Hope and Risk: Dominican Prospects Turn to
Supplements Designed for Animals, WASH. POST, June 23, 2003, at AOl.
34 id.
35 Steve Fainaru, MLB to Evaluate Drug Test Policy, WASH. POST, July 14,
2003. at DOI.
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36Republic and Venezuela would be too complicated and expensive, a
claim not supported by MLB's own consultant in the Dominican
Republic 7 Robert Manfred, MLB's vice president for labor relations,
succinctly captured MLB's reasons and attitude about PED use in Latin
America when he said that MLB did not want to spend the resources on
implementing a drug prevention and treatment program in Latin America
because MLB did not want "to flush a lot of money down the toilet."
38
MLB's position on its Latin minor league operations caused a
firestorm of criticism. Hispanics Across America, a non-governmental
organization led by activist Fernando Mateo, attacked MLB for its stance
on the PED problem among Latin minor league players and prospects. 9
Others, including the authors, 40 criticized MLB for its complacency and
neglect of a problem at the heart of MLB's best sources of foreign
baseball talent.
MLB's discriminatory attitude provoked the Governor of New
York, George E. Pataki, to hold a press conference in New York City on
the day of the MLB All-Star Game in July 2003 in order to express his
concerns about MLB's behavior and to encourage MLB to pay more
attention to PED use in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.4' In his
remarks, Governor Pataki stated:
36 Fainaru, Injecting Hope, supra note 33.
37 Fainaru, MLB to Evaluate Drug Test Policy, supra note 35.
38  d.
39 See Press Release, Governor George E. Pataki, Governor Supports HAA Effort
to Protect Hispanic Youth, (July 15, 2003) (on file with authors) (describing
Hispanics Across America's "effort to encourage Major League Baseball to
implement a drug-testing program for its Latin American operations in
Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, where two players died after injecting
themselves with animal steroids to enhance performance.").
40 See, e.g., Memorandum from Arturo Marcano and David P. Fidler to Allan H.
(Bud) Selig, Sandy Alderson, Robert D. Manfred, Jr., Louis Melendez, and
Rafael Perez, on Chemical Substances and Major League Baseball's Minor
League System in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, (June 27, 2003) (on
file with authors).
41 Press Release, Governor George E. Pakaki, supra note 39. Fernando Mateo of
Hispanics Across America and the authors also spoke at Governor Pataki's July
2003 press conference.
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We are saying one thing quite simply: No double stan-
dards. We cannot allow Major League Baseball to look
the other way. Let's just ask Major League Baseball to
look into its heart and to understand that we welcome the
talent from around the world, and, in particular from Latin
America, but we want them to have the same safeguards
and the same potential. That's not too much to ask.42
The criticism prompted MLB to address the PED problem in its
Latin minor league operations. MLB began a drug-testing program in the
Dominican Republic during the 2004 Summer League season, and, in
2005, MLB introduced the program to Venezuela.43 In this article, we
refer to the program used in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela as
the Latin Summer League DPT Program. The Program's objective is "to
prevent and end the use of Prohibited Substances . . .by non-40 man
roster players participating in the ... Summer League .... The Office of
the Commission has concluded that the use of Prohibited Substances is
potentially hazardous to a Player's health and may give a Player an
unfair competitive advantage on the playing field.,
44
This article focuses on the problems with the Latin Summer
League DPT Program, but a few points should be raised now to illustrate
concerns explored in more detail below. First, the Latin Summer League
DPT Program does not apply in full to minor league players in the
Dominican Republic. MLB claims that it cannot suspend players who
test positive for PEDs in the Dominican Republic because of Dominican
labor laws,45 a claim disputed by persons familiar with MLB's activities
42 Steve Fainaru & Christine Haughney, Pataki Urges MLB on Testing, WASH.
POST, July 16, 2003, at DOI.
43 Geoff Baker, Growing Pains: Venezuela Deals with Steroid Testing, SEATTLE
TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006, available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/
cgi-bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug-steroidsl2&date=20061112&
query-growing+pains%3A+venezuela. Arturo Marcano provided translations
for Geoff Baker during his interviews in Venezuela.
44 Major League Baseball's Venezuelan Summer League Drug Prevention and
Treatment Program, 2006 [hereinafter Latin Summer League DPT Program], at 1.
45 Tom Farrey, Results: Dominicans Fail More Tests than U.S. Players, ESPN,
Apr. 14, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id 2033711 (noting
that MLB's understanding is that, under Dominican law, "employers are not
allowed to suspend employees who fail drug tests").
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in the Dominican Republic.46 Second, the scope of the Latin Summer
League DPT Program does not appear to cover all minor league activities
MLB teams undertake in Venezuela and the Dominican Republic
because the Summer League constitutes only one part of such activities,
which operate year-round in the baseball academies of MLB teams. We
return to these and other problems later in the article.47
MLB's development of the Major League, Minor League, and
Latin Summer League DPT Programs in the past six years demonstrates
the seriousness of the threat PED use poses to MLB as a global sport.
MLB's adoption of these programs parallels the intensified international
efforts of groups like the WADA to address PEDs in other sports, such as
the establishment and activities of WADA, especially the World Anti-
Doping Code. This article now turns its attention to the MLB strategies.
The overlap in the international and MLB anti-PED efforts provides an
opportunity to use the WADA approaches as comparators in analyzing
how MLB has addressed the PED problem in its Latin minor league
operations.
III. THE PROBLEM OF PERFORMANCE-ENHANCING DRUGS AMONG
PLAYERS AND PROSPECTS IN MLB's MINOR LEAGUE SYSTEM IN
LATIN AMERICA
A. Empirical Evidence of a Serious Problem of Performance-
Enhancing Drug Use by Latin Minor League Players
As mentioned above, investigative reporting done by Steve
Fainaru of the Washington Post brought to the public's attention in 2003
the existence of a significant problem of PED use among minor league
players and prospects in the Dominican Republic. In 2005, other investi-
gative reporting confirmed the depth and seriousness of the problem,
including the continued, widespread use of steroids designed for
livestock.4 8 Given the extensive involvement of MLB teams in the
46 Id. (quoting Fernando Mateo of Hispanics Across America as arguing that
MLB's claim about the impact of Dominican law on the ability to suspend
players is "nonsense").
47 See infra notes 227-307 and accompanying text.
48 See Geoff Baker, Life in Needle Park, TORONTO STAR, May 14, 2005, at EO1;
Geoff Baker, Harvesting the Dominican Diamond Mine, TORONTO STAR, May
15. 2005. at B06.
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Dominican Republic and Venezuela, the idea that the teams were not
aware of the on-going use of PEDs in these markets for talent is pre-
posterous. Empirical evidence collected in the application of drug-testing
programs eliminates any possibility of MLB teams feigning ignorance of
the PED problem or MLB claiming that its drug-testing programs have
proved successful.
After implementation of the Major League and Minor League
DPT Programs in 2005, nearly 50% of those players suspended for using
illegal PEDs were from Latin American countries, with 46% of suspen-
sions involving players from the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.49
See Table 2. Since the start of the 2005 season, 58.5% of players who
tested positive for PEDs (169 of 289) in the major leagues, and all minor
league operations, including those in Latin America, came from the
Dominican Republic. Of the players who tested positive during this time
(289), 157 were suspended. Of these 157 suspended players, 37 (approxi-
mately 24%) were players from the Dominican Republic playing minor
league ball in North America, and 35 (approximately 22%) were Vene-
zuelans playing minor league ball in Venezuela and North America.
The other 132 Dominican players who have tested positive since the start
of the 2005 season played in the Dominican Summer League, and thus,
could not, according to MLB, be suspended under Dominican law.51 In
April 2005, MLB suspended 38 U.S.-based minor league players for
testing positive for PEDs, and nearly half of these suspended players
cumulatively came from the Dominican Republic (9) and Venezuela
(8). 2 In 2006 alone, 74% (25 out of 34) major and minor league players
who tested positive for PEDs came from Venezuela (13) and the
Dominican Republic (12). 53 It is not clear whether these statistics include
positive results from off-season testing under the Latin Summer League
DPT Program. In addition, the statistics from the Dominican Republic
and Venezuela do not include any testing of players not under contract




52 Farrey, supra note 45.
53 Baker, Growing Pains, supra note 43.
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with a MLB team, which means the extent of the use of PEDs in these
countries is likely greater than the statistics indicate.54
Table 2. Suspensions for Positive PED Tests since Start of 2005 Season
55
Country of Number of Suspended Percentage of Total
Nationality Players Suspensions (157)
United States 72 46%









Puerto Rico 1 .64%
*This number does not include the 132 Dominicans who played minor league
ball in the Dominican Republic and who tested positive because, according to
MLB, these players cannot be suspended under Dominican law.
**This number covers Venezuelan minor league players in North and Latin
America.
These statistics indicate that PED use by Latin American major
and minor league players is a serious problem that MLB knowingly
ignored for too long. The empirical evidence of PED use by Latin major
and minor league players raises a number of questions that require
analysis. First, the statistics reveal a prevalence of PED use among Latin
players apparently higher than PED use among non-Latin players in the
major and minor leagues. Explaining why this higher prevalence exists
requires consideration of many factors, 56 including examination of the
54 This feature of PED testing in the Dominican Republic upset Fernando Mateo
of Hispanics Across America, who criticized MLB for only testing players under
contract. See Farrey, supra note 45.
55 Fish, Steroid Problem Reaches Critical Mass in the D.R., supra note 49.
56 U.S. players may, for example, be more adept at disguising their use of PEDs
compared to Latin players.
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socio-economic context from which most Latin players attempt to enter
the minor leagues in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.57 Although
poverty and the lack of formal education do not excuse Latin players
from using PEDs, MLB has to take the socio-economic context into
account in designing and implementing its drug-testing and prevention
programs for the Latin minor league system.
Second, the statistics suggest serious problems in MLB's initial
attempts to apply drug prevention and treatment programs to its minor
league operations in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. Contra-
dictory explanations from MLB about the cause of these problems under-
score concerns about the way MLB has handled them. On the one hand,
Robert Manfred, MLB's vice president for labor relations, argued that
MLB has spent "literally millions of dollars on educational programs in
the Dominican Republic" '58 and that the idea of ill-informed players in
Venezuela is "nonsense., 59 A high-ranking MLB executive likewise
argued, "If you do this as long as I have, there's one thing you learn:
People who are positive under these policies, it's never their fault. It's
always, 'Somebody didn't tell me,' or 'The dog ate my homework. "
60
On the other hand, investigative reporting has revealed a signi-
ficant level of ignorance and lack of information among Latin minor
league players. For example, Ian Gordon of ESPN reported that many
Venezuelan players and coaches told him that they had never seen a copy
of the Spanish-language version of the Latin Summer League DPT
Program.61 In agreeing to do public service announcements for MLB on
the PED problem among Latin minor leaguers, Chicago White Sox
manager and Venezuelan Ozzie Guillen lamented that the Latin minor
league players "don't know what's good and what's bad... [n]inety-nine
percent of the time, those kids don't know what they take or what you
can take.. .it's not fair for the kids to suffer because of ignorance and not
17 See infra Part III.B.
58 Associated Press, Amphetamine Testing Changing Baseball Culture, SPOR-
TING NEWS, Sept. 28, 2006, available at http://www.sportingnews.com/
yourtumrviewtopic.php?t- 132648.
59 Baker, Growing Pains, supra note 43.
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getting good information., 62 Boston Red Sox player David Ortiz, who is
from the Dominican Republic, observed, "You might think everyone's
got the message, but they don't., 63 Ronaldo Peralta, who is in charge of
MLB's office in the Dominican Republic, identified the lack of infor-
mation and education for Latin players as the biggest problem with
PEDs. 64 All these observations raise questions about the reality of the
alleged "literally millions of dollars ' 65 spent on educating players.66 We
take a closer look at this and other problems below, 67 and then we con-
sider the Latin minor league drug program in more detail to provide a
deeper understanding of its flaws and ways to make the program more
equitable and effective.
68
B. Poverty, Children, Buscones, Weak Pharmaceutical Regulation,
and Performance-Enhancing Drugs: A Dangerous Cocktail
As noted earlier, MLB based its drug-testing program for the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela on the Minor League DPT Program
applied in the United States and Canada. This strategy neglects to con-
sider the different environments in which the minor league systems in
North America and Latin America operate. Preventing PED use in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela faces socio-economic challenges
that are not confronted in North America. These challenges provide some
insight into why Latin minor league drug-testing statistics raise questions
about the percentages of Latin players testing positive for PEDs.
The realities of PED use in any sport are complex, and the
factors that combine to create the PED problem in MLB's Latin minor
league system produce a tangled web of incentives and influences.
Within this complexity four factors are most salient: (1) the impact of
62 Scott Melkin, Guillen Sends Important Message, MLB, June 6, 2007,
http://www.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd-20070606&content id-2008853&v
key-news mlb&fext-.jsp&c id-mlb&partnered-rss mlb.
63 Gordon, supra note 60.
64 Fish, Steroid Problem Reaches Critical Mass in the D.R., supra note 49.
65 Associated Press, Amphetamine Testing Changing Baseball Culture, supra
note 58.
66 See Baker, Growing Pains, supra note 43 (noting criticisms in Venezuela that
MLB has done a poor job informing players about the drug-testing program).
67 See infra Part III.C.
68 See infra Part IV.
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poverty in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela; (2) MLB's focus in
Latin America on recruiting and training children; (3) the involvement of
the so-called buscones in channeling Latin talent into minor league
contracts with MLB teams; and (4) different regulatory environments
affecting access to performance-enhancing substances. We look at each
factor independently and then consider their cumulative effect in pro-
ducing an environment that is conducive to PED use in the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela.
1. The Poverty Problem
Analyses of MLB's recruiting and training practices in Latin
America have often noted that MLB largely targets prospects that live in
difficult socio-economic conditions, especially the vast majority of
players in the Dominican Republic. MLB often takes pride in being able
to offer players who live in poverty the opportunity to have a better life
through professional baseball. However, this opportunity generates
negative externalities that contribute to the PED problem.
Tom Farrey of ESPN described the temptations to use PEDs that
young prospects in the Dominican Republic face as they attempt to
escape a life of poverty through MLB:
The lure of big money and a better life has led some
Dominican players to put just about anything in their
bodies that they believe will help them attract major
league scouts. Unable to afford steroids, some turn to
cheap veterinary preparations that can be more danger-
ous than steroids. Some have died after injecting a
souped-up vitamin compound called Diamino, which is
designed for sick livestock and sold out of pet stores.
69
In both the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, fierce compe-
tition fuels the potential attractiveness of PEDs to young baseball players
trying to escape poverty. MLB teams sign hundreds of prospects each
69 Farrey, supra note 45; see also Fish, Steroid Problem Reaches Critical Mass
in the D.R., supra note 49 (noting that the "lure of the money that comes with
success" is one factor driving children to use PEDs); Merkin, supra note 62
(quoting Chicago White Sox manager Ozzie Guillen stating, "If you come
from our country [Venezuela] and your family is begging for help and
someone says, 'You take this and you'll become a superstar,' obviously you
are going to do it").
2007]
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
year, but only a small percentage of these players will ever play minor or
major league baseball in the United States. As one Venezuelan prospect
put it, "if there's 20 pitchers at the start, only three go to the U.S ...
that's pressure., 70 As Baseball America noted, "Teen-age Latin players
are signed to pro contracts, but there's little patience shown by MLB
teams in helping them develop physically, emotionally and culturally ...
too often, the young prospect falls through the cracks and disappears., 71
In this competitive environment, players may explore any option, inclu-
ding PEDs, which might give them the edge to beat the statistical odds.
MLB is not the source of the poor socio-economic conditions in
the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, and poverty provides no excuse
for prospects that use PEDs. However, the strategy to address the PED
problem in the Latin minor league system should take into account the
poverty and socio-economic difficulties that prospects face, year after
year. MLB itself promotes the "rags to riches" opportunity it offers,
knowing that the vast majority of youth who attempt to seize this
opportunity will not succeed. At the very least, MLB should construct
and implement its drug program in Latin American countries in a way
that demonstrates MLB's awareness of this unique and difficult
environment. Instead, MLB has simply taken the drug-testing program it
developed for the minor leagues in North America and applied it to the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela. We analyze below how MLB fails
to live up to its responsibilities related to the socio-economic context of
its Latin American markets.
72
2. Children Under Contract
A second important factor in understanding the environment in
which PED use among Latin minor league players and prospects occurs
involves MLB's interest in scouting, signing, and training children in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela. The preference MLB teams have
for evaluating and signing Latin children who are under the age of 18 is
70 Gordon, supra note 60.
7' Tracy Ringolsby, Ramirez Successfully Aspired to a Hire Position, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 8, 2006, available at http://www.rockymountainnews.
com/drmnlsports columnists/article/0, 1299,DRMN 83 4621773,00.html.
72 See infra Part IV.
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well known.73 The very cohort MLB seeks to attract with opportunities to
escape poverty and economic hardship is among the most vulnerable in
these societies. International law and the domestic legal systems of most
countries recognize that the vulnerability of children heightens the
responsibility of parents, businesses, and governments to protect children
from harm and exploitation.74 Paulo David captured the vulnerability of
children and the responsibility of adults, in relation to PEDs with the
following argument: "Athletes under 18 who are caught using illicit sub-
stances should be considered victims rather than criminals and [should]
not be judged in the same way as adults." 75
In the past, MLB has not properly shouldered the responsibility
of protecting Latin American prospects from the harms of PED use. As
noted earlier, Steve Fainaru's investigative reporting brought the extent
of the PED problem among Dominican baseball prospects to light in
2003, but Fainaru merely exposed what baseball people in the Domini-
can Republic already knew was a growing phenomenon. Far from show-
ing leadership in combating the PED challenge within the vulnerable
populations that MLB sought to tap, MLB reacted as if it had no respon-
sibilities for responding to the problem it helped create. MLB did not
consider the health and welfare of children in the Dominican Republic
and Venezuela vulnerable to pressure, persuasion, and ignorance con-
cerning PEDs important enough for MLB to concern it with. Protecting
these children from the harms of PEDs was just too complex and
expensive for this billion-dollar global business. MLB did not perceive
that its economic activities were heightening the vulnerability of child-
ren; instead, it worried about "flushing money down the toilet.,
76
As noted above, MLB's lack of action in Latin America fueled
criticism about its initial complacency concerning PED use in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela.. MLB certainly did not follow the
guidance promulgated by WADA, which understands the dangers PEDs
73 Under international law, persons under 18 years old are children. United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, at art. 1, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/24 (Nov. 20, 1989).
74 Id. at Preamble (noting that "the child, by reason of his physical and mental
immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal
protection, before as well as after birth").
75 DAVID, supra note 8, at 115.
76 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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pose to children, emphasizes protecting children from PEDs, and pro-
motes educating children about the harm such substances can cause to
their health.77 Starting in 2001, MLB implemented a drug prevention and
treatment program for its minor league operations in the United States
and Canada, which suggested it understood the threat to the integrity of
the game and the health of players PEDs can pose. Yet, MLB's initial
response demonstrated that PED use in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela somehow did not constitute a threat to the game's integrity or
children's health sufficient to take any action in those countries, despite
the fact that they were the best sources of foreign talent for MLB.
The program MLB implemented in the Dominican Republic in
2004 and Venezuela in 2005 came only in response to criticism. Unfor-
tunately, MLB's lack of interest in the needs of children in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela is a long-standing feature of MLB's
behavior. For example, although MLB prohibits teams from encouraging
prospects in North America from leaving school,78 it has never attempted
to discourage teams from luring children in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela out of school to play professional baseball. 79 A key aspect of
77 Richard W. Pound, Education's Promise, PLAY TRUE, Issue 3-2004, at 1
(WADA Chairman arguing that "if we do a good job education our children,
their parents, and those who help them become better athletes, they will, by and
large, play by the rules. Education means teaching young athletes and their
entourages that doping is bad for them, that it ruins their health and can lead to
long-term fatal consequences. It also means teaching them that doping is
wrong.").
78 Major League Rules (July 2003), 3(a)(2) (prohibiting MLB teams from
signing high school players in the United States, Puerto Rico, and Canada during
the period of their eligibility to participate in high school athletics), 3(a)(3)
(prohibiting MLB teams from signing players in colleges in the United States,
Puerto Rico, and Canada except under specific conditions, and 3(g)(1) (prohibi-
ting MLB teams from trying to influence a student to withdraw from high school
or college).
79 Danielle Sessa, Baseball's All-Star Secret: Camps Offer Kids Low Pay, No
School, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 5, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid-20601079&sid-a3OpuVpKY5z8&refer-home (According to Dominican
Senator Charles Noel Mariotti, "The academies offer players very little help in
finishing their education, drawing the ire of some government leaders". Mariotti
says "Social responsibility has been practically nonexistent. There should be a
stronger commitment for the things that are key to the country's development.
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Part IV of this article will be to determine whether what MLB has put in
place sufficiently responds to the need to protect vulnerable children who
seek to play professional baseball with MLB teams from the dangers of
PEDs. A continued failure to do so will be particularly damning of
MLB's attitude and capabilities towards such an important human rights
issue.
3. The Business of Buscones
The third factor to examine in comprehending the context of
PED use in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela relates to the struc-
ture and dynamics of minor league baseball in these countries. In the
United States, Puerto Rico, and Canada, baseball players in high school
and college are subject to the annual MLB draft.80 Four sets of rules
protect these players in their relationships with MLB teams.
First, the rules of the MLB draft itself prevent MLB teams from
competing for top talent because the prospects are not free agents who
can sign with the team making the best offer. As noted above, MLB's
rules also prohibit teams from trying to entice players in North America
from leaving high school to play professional baseball.8'
Second, for players in college in the United States, the rules of
the NCAA regulate contacts and relationships between players, potential
agents, and professional teams.82 These rules attempt to keep the busi-
ness of baseball and other professional sports at arms length from the
amateur competition in which college teams partake. Third, the MLBPA
considers players who are subject to the annual draft to be potential
members of the players' association, so the MLBPA negotiates on the
The vast majority of these youngsters don't have diplomas."). Some MLB teams
have started to re-think how they approach education of their Latin minor league
players, but the MLB Conmmissioner's Office still has no standardized policy on
the educational responsibilities of MLB teams. See Melissa Segura, Social
Responsibility: Indians, Mets Lead Charge for Education at Academies, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, May 14, 2007, available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/
writers/melissa segura/05 /14/onthemoney/index.html.
80 ARTURO J. MARCANO GUERVARA & DAVID P. FIDLER, STEALING LIVES: THE
GLOBALIZATION OF BASEBALL AND THE TRAGIC STORY OF ALEXIS QUIROz 25
(2002).
81 See sources cited supra notes 78-79.
82 MARCANO & FIDLER, STEALING LIVES, supra note 80, at 27-28.
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draft through collective bargaining with MLB. 3 Fourth, U.S. and Cana-
dian systems of domestic law apply to the contractual and labor relations
between players, agents, and professional teams, which provides another
layer of protection against exploitation and abuse. 4
However, the governance of the relationships between Latin
children, young men, and MLB teams is radically different. To begin,
Latin prospects are free agents who are not subject to the annual draft.
Accordingly, the protections for potential draftees in the United States,
Canada, and Puerto Rico do not extend to Dominican and Venezuelan
prospects. The layer of regulations applied by the NCAA for college
players also does not apply to, or otherwise exist in, the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela. Latin minor league players and prospects do
not have a players' union to represent their interests vis-A-vis MLB and
MLB teams. Finally, although the Dominican and Venezuelan govern-
ments have jurisdiction to regulate MLB activities in their territories;
domestic laws and governmental efforts to improve the treatment of
children in the MLB system have historically been ineffective.
85
The free agency system in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela has spawned structural features that have no counterpart in the
United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico. None of these features is more
prominent and problematic than the role played by buscones. In brief,
buscones are people who find, train, and sell baseball talent to MLB
teams. Buscones are not agents in the way agents work for professional
athletes in North America. After a buscon's prospect signs a minor
league contract and the buscon gets his percentage of the signing bonus,
the buscon's relationship with that player usually ends. 86 The buscon's
83 See Allan Simpson, The Amateur Free Agent Draft, in TOTAL BASEBALL: THE
OFFICIAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 608, 609 (John Thorn,
Pete Palmer, & Michael Gershman eds., 4th ed. 1995).
84 MARCANO & FIDLER, STEALING LIVES, supra note 80, at 28.
85 MARCANO & FIDLER, STEALING LIVES, supra note 80, at 47,181 (noting
passage in the Dominican Republic in 1985 of a law mandating baseball
academies provide players with adequate food, lodging, and medical necessities
and MLB's effort in 2001, in response to criticism and negative press coverage
about conditions in the baseball academies, to inspect all training complexes in
the Dominican Republic and Venezuela to establish minimum living and
training standards).
16 Some buscones seek a percentage of a signed player's salary in addition to a
percentage of the signing bonus. See, e.g.,Gordon Edes, Youth Swerved on
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economic incentive is to get as many prospects signed to minor league
contracts as possible. What happens to the players after they sign the
contracts is of little or no concern to most buscones.
The buscon systems in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela
are diverse enterprises, and the complexity of the situations in both
countries should not be overlooked. Some buscones work exclusively
with one team or a small number of teams. Other buscones peddle
prospects to the highest MLB team bidder. Some buscones try hard to do
right by the players with whom they work;87 however, many buscones
treat children and young men as commodities to be bought and sold for
the highest profit.88 As described by Barry Svrluga of the Washington
Post, buscones are:
[P]art coaches, part providers, part hustlers, part finan-
cial advisers-identifying and cultivating talent, prepar-
ing players for tryouts, then selling them in the July
following their 16th birthdays to the highest-bidding
major league teams. Depending on the arrangement, the
buscones end up with anywhere from 10 to 30 percent of
the signing bonuses except in the countless instances
in which they rip off an illiterate and unsuspecting
family.89
Island: Ortiz Deeply Troubled by Dominican Report, BOSTON GLOBE, May 4,
2004, available at http://www.boston.com/sports/baseball/redsox/articles/
2004/05/04/youth is swerved on island/?page-1 (reporting on the case of Raul
Mondesi, who was sued in Dominican courts by his buscon for payment of a
percentage of Mondesi's major league salary).
87 Steve Fainaru, The Business of Building Ballplayers: In Dominican Republic,
Scouts Find the Talent and Take the Money, WASH. POST, June 17, 2001, at AO1
(noting that, "[i]n many cases, buscones ... are above-board coaches who spend
considerable time and resources to support athletes").
88 Id. (noting that "[t]he increased demand for foreign talent has created a
cutthroat industry of street-level entrepreneurs dedicated to the locating and
grooming potential major leaguers" and that this "growth has been accompanied
by reports of over-charging, extortion and outright theft").
89 Barry Svrluga, Tapping into an Economy of Scale-Dominican Prospects
Such as Nationals' Esmailyn Gonzalez are Products of a System Where Players
are Auctioned Off by Sometimes Unethical Agents, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2006,
at EO1.
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MLB teams benefit from the buscones' efforts. Ronaldo Peralta,
who runs the MLB office in the Dominican Republic, observed that
buscones "are a very important part of the industry. They help fill a gap,
because there's not a lot of organized baseball in the Dominican
Republic. They provide a service." 90 Even though it benefits from the
buscones, MLB considers the buscones' business beyond its control and
responsibility. Peralta argued, "[o]fficially, we do not have jurisdiction
over [buscones]. There is only so much we can do." 91 MLB has also said
it is "helpless to do anything directly" about the problems associated
with the buscones.
92
Analyses of the PED problem in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela often observe that buscones are a serious part of the problem.
For example, Porfirio Veras, the Dominican Republic's baseball com-
missioner, lays significant blame for the PED problem in his country on
buscones, who "are the ones who supply young players with medical
substances, like steroids... [buscones] use every means to make the kids
stronger and more interesting when they show them to the scouts. I know
of cases of trainers who injected kids with steroids only days before
trying out for the major league scouts. ' '93 Boston Red Sox player David
Ortiz, who is from the Dominican Republic, responded to reports of PED
use by Dominican prospects by saying, "They're putting people in
danger for money. That's not right. It's not fair what they're doing with
those kids. I blame the buscones. They're the ones who know that the
guys will get paid if they show a good body, show some talent, and then
they'll make money., 94 Chicago White Sox manager Ozzie Guillen also
blames the "unregulated network of hangers-on, trainers and scouts"
because "the main problem is the people who surround these kids, who
lie to these kids, who give them supplements they're not supposed to,




93 Associated Press, Steroid Rules Tripping Up Latin Players, DESERET NEWS
(SALT LAKE CITY), May 5, 2005, at D5. See also Svrluga, supra note 88 (noting
that "[the fight for players is fierce and, sometimes, shady. Buscones have been
known to juice players on steroids in the weeks before a tryout, adding miles per
hour to their fastballs or distance to their home runs.").
94 Edes, supra note 86.
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we have to control., 95 Buscones who engage in these practices are
exploiting children for profit while exposing them to substances that can
harm their health or even kill them. Paulo David has argued that "[t]he
situation of the child or adolescent athlete coerced into doping by adults




If the Dominican baseball commissioner understands the role of
buscones in the PED problem in his country, MLB and MLB teams
cannot pretend that the buscon problem is beyond the scope of MLB's
responsibilities in its Latin American operations. In reflecting on the
buscon system in the Dominican Republic, Steve Fainaru of the Wash-
ington Post noted that MLB "decries the abuses but effectively created
the system that fosters them., 97 The buscones are part of the structure
and dynamics of professional baseball in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela, and the role of buscones must be tackled in dealing with the
PED problem in these countries. In Part IV, we scrutinize whether the
drug prevention and treatment program MLB has implemented in Latin
America sufficiently addresses the role buscones play in influencing
children and young men who seek to play professional baseball with
MLB teams.
4. Regulation ofAccess to Performance-Enhancing Substances
A fourth factor influencing the context of PED use in Latin
American countries involves differences between how governments
regulate access to performance-enhancing substances. A common theme
in analyses about the PED problem is the wide-spread availability of
performance-enhancing substances in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela. In these countries, access to PEDs is gained both legally and
illicitly. Some of the substances on MLB's prohibited list may legally be
purchased and used in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, which
can produce confusion among young Latin players. 98 The scope of the
9' Gordon, supra note 60.
96 DAVID, supra note 8, at 116.
97 Fainaru, The Business of Building Ballplayers, supra note 87.
98 Baker, Growing Pains, supra note 43 (noting that most of the drugs prohibited
by MLB's drug-testing and prevention program are legal in Venezuela and are
commonly used); BRYANT, supra note 2, at 200 (stating that "anabolic steroids
were largely legal in . . .the Dominican Republic"); Gordon, supra note 60
("Because pharmaceutical regulations are looser in Venezuela than in the U.S.,
players who pay little attention to labels may not know what sort of banned
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PED problem also suggests that a fair amount of illegal activity is taking
place, both in terms of obtaining and of using performance-enhancing
substances.
Part of the problem with illicit PED access and use stems from
the difficulties the Dominican and Venezuelan governments have with
adequately regulating their respective retail pharmaceutical sectors. Pub-
lic health experts have noted greater unregulated access to pharma-
ceutical products in many developing countries that generally lack
effective regulatory systems and, more importantly, effective enforce-
ment systems. Thus, people can obtain a wide-range of pharmaceutical
products, from antibiotics to steroids, over-the-counter with no prescrip-
tion or guidance as to the appropriate use of the products. 99 These weaker
regulatory systems are also vulnerable to ineffective or even harmful
counterfeit drugs, which vendors knowingly and unintentionally sell as
genuine articles. 0 0 According to the WHO, "[t]he Dominican Republic's
Public Health Department reported [in 2005] that 50% of the country's
pharmacies operated illegally and 10% of the medicines that arrived in
the country were fake. For example, some of the medicines found had
expired over 10 years before."101
MLB is not responsible for the pharmaceutical regulatory pro-
blems that the governments of the Dominican Republic and Venezuela
face in their respective pharmaceutical sectors. Nevertheless, these regu-
latory issues are an important factor in understanding the environment in
which MLB is trying to address PED use in its Latin minor league
operations. Therefore, MLB needs to consider these issues and ensure
that its overall strategy for reducing PED use is sensitive to the different
substances are lurking in legal dietary supplements and over-the-counter
medicines.").
99 Farrey, supra note 45 (observing that, in the Dominican Republic "steroids
can be obtained from loosely regulated pharmacies").
100 World Health Organization International Medicinal Products Anti-
Counterfeiting Taskforce, Counterfeit Medicines: An Update on Estimates, Nov.
15, 2006, http://www.who.int/medicines/services/counterfeit/impact/TheNew
EstimatesCounterfeit.pdf (stating that "many developing countries of Africa,
parts of Asia, and parts of Latin America have areas where more that 30% of the
medicines on sale can be counterfeit.").
101 WHO, Counterfeit Medicines, Fact Sheet No. 275, Nov. 14, 2006,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs275/en/index.html.
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regulatory approaches that the Dominican Republic and Venezuela use.
Part IV examines whether MLB's approach is in fact sensitive to these
regulatory issues.
C. Lost in Transition: Issues Emerging from the Application
of the Latin Drug Testing Program
The four factors described above combine to create a very
difficult and complex environment for untangling the strands of the PED
problem in Latin American countries. In Latin America, the PED pro-
blem is more complicated than many other challenges that MLB faces
and over which it has more direct control, such as translating minor
league contracts into Spanish and providing safe and sanitary conditions
in baseball academies. 10 2 These complexities became apparent as MLB
made the transition from no drug testing in Latin America to a drug-
testing program that is based largely on the Minor League DPT Program
applied in the United States and Canada. In Latin America, this transition
to testing for drug use was dramatic and occurred in a compressed period
of time because of the intense pressure and criticism that MLB faced for
"double standards" in this area.
Newspaper reporting on the impact of MLB's transition to drug
testing in Latin America reveals a host of emerging issues that MLB and
other stakeholders must address as the transition continues. A frequent
complaint about MLB's implementation of its Latin American drug-
testing effort is a lack of knowledge on the part of players, scouts, and
buscones regarding the rules MLB applies. 10 3 Concerns have also arisen
about the fairness of the drug-testing program, particularly in light of the
socio-economic differences between the United States and Canada, and
Latin American countries.
0 4
102 On MLB's past practices on these issues, see MARCANO & FIDLER, STEALING
LIVES, supra note 80, at 41-44 (on contracts) and 44-48 (on baseball
academies).
103 See generally Fish, Steroid Problem Reaches Critical Mass in the D.R., supra
note 49 (noting lack of information as a problem for Latin minor league
players); Gordon, supra note 60, (reporting on lack of information among
Venezuelan minor league players); Baker, Growing Pains, supra note 43
(reporting the same).
104 Baker, Growing Pains, supra note 43.
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One of the fairness concerns involves MLB's application of
sanctions against players who test positive for PEDs. MLB claims that it
cannot sanction a player in the Dominican Republic who tests positive
under the drug-testing program because local Dominican labor law
prevents it. However, MLB sanctions Venezuelan players who test posi-
tive for the same PEDs. This different treatment raises the complex con-
cerns mentioned earlier. Is MLB to blame for Venezuelans being
punished but not Dominicans, if Dominican law does not permit sanc-
tions for testing positive for PEDs? Is Dominican labor law really the
barrier to sanctions that MLB asserts, or is something else going on that
skews MLB's application of the drug-testing program in the Dominican
Republic?
The remainder of this article critically analyzes MLB's drug-
testing efforts in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela in order to shed
light on these and other issues emerging from the transition from no drug
testing to the Latin version of the Minor League DPT Program. Problems
with such a dramatic change were sure to develop, but the manner in
which MLB made this transition has unnecessarily exacerbated the
problems. Fundamental notions of fairness towards, and respect for,
Latin children and young men have been lost in this transition.
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LATIN VERSION OF THE MINOR
LEAGUE DRUG PREVENTION AND TREATMENT PROGRAM
Initially, MLB argued that the Minor League DPT Program
would be too complex and costly to apply in the Dominican Republic
and Venezuela. 10 5 However, when MLB could no longer maintain its
position that it has no responsibility for drug testing in Latin America,
MLB fell back on the Minor League DPT template implemented in 2001
for its minor league operations in the United States and Canada. In this
section, we first describe the Minor League DPT Program to provide an
overview of the rules and institutions it creates. We then consider how
MLB adapted and implemented the Minor League DPT Program in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela.
10 6
105 Fainaru, Injecting Hope-and Risk, supra note 33.
106 See infra Part IV.B.
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A. The Basic Framework: The Minor League DPT Program
MLB established the Minor League DPT Program "to prevent
and end the use of Prohibited Substances.. .by non 40-man roster Minor
League players" because "the use of Prohibited Substances is potentially
hazardous to a Player's health and may give a Player an unfair competi-
tive advantage on the playing field."'10 7 The Minor League DPT Program
bans the use of "Prohibited Substances" by minor league players,
establishes a regime of random testing, creates sanctions for players who
test positive for Prohibited Substances, contains an appeal process for
players to challenge positive tests results, and constructs institutional
mechanisms to oversee and implement the Program. Below, we describe
each of these major components of the Minor League DPT Program.
1. Ban on Prohibited Substances
The key substantive rules in the Minor League DPT Program are
those banning the use, possession, selling, or distribution of any
Prohibited Substance. The Program defines "Prohibited Substance" as
either a "Drug of Abuse" or a "Performance Enhancing Substance."
' 08
Drugs of Abuse are any drug or substance that appears in Schedules I
and II of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations Schedule of Controlled
Substances, '09 except those substances the Program defines as a Perfor-
mance Enhancing Substance." l0 In addition to PEDs that are specifically
identified in the program, MLB can designate new Performance
Enhancing Substances "at any time if it determines that the ingestion of
such substance would result in a player having an unfair competitive
advantage on the playing field."11' Table 3 lists the Program's non-
exclusive list of Drugs of Abuse and Performance Enhancing Substances.
107 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 1.
108 Id. at 2.
109 21 C.F.R. Part § 1308 (2007).
110 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 2.
... Id. at 2-3. Interestingly, this provision does not state that the MLB can
designate a new Performance Enhancing Substance if it threatens the health of
the player, one of the key objectives of the policy.
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Table 3. Minor League DPT Program Non-Exclusive List of Drugs
of Abuse and Performance Enhancing Substances 12
Drugs ofAbuse Performance Enhancing Substances
" Cocaine - Anabolic androgenic steroids
" LSD - Prohormone nutritional supplements
" Marijuana - Amphetamine and its analogs
" Opiates (heroin, codeine, * Ephedrine and related substances
morphine) * Human Growth Hormone (HGH)
" Phencyclidine (PCP) • Insulin-like growth factors (e.g., IGF-1),
" MDMA (Ecstasy or X) related releasing factors and substances
" GHB with similar biological effects
" Erythropoietin (EPO)
" Diuretics and masking agents
" Miscellaneous anabolic agents (e.g.,
clenbuterol, zeranol, zilpaterol)
2. Testing
The Minor League DPT Program establishes two types of testing
for minor league players. First, the Program annually subjects players to
as many as four unannounced tests for Drugs of Abuse and Performance
Enhancing Substances. 113 The Program may subject any player who tests
positive for a Prohibited Substance to additional testing beyond the
standard four annual tests. 14 Second, if any member of the Minor
League Health Policy Advisory Committee (MLHPAC), the committee
created to administer and oversee the Program (see more below), has
reasonable cause to believe that a player has engaged in the use, posses-
sion, or distribution of a Prohibited Substance, the player in question can
be tested immediately.115 The Minor League DPT Program spells out the
procedures for collection of test samples and contains the testing
protocols for determining the presence of a Prohibited Substance.' 16
Failure or refusal to take a required test or any attempt to substitute,
112 Id. at 2 5.
113 Id. at 5.
114 id.
115 Id. at7.
116 I. at Addendum A.
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dilute, mask, or adulterate a test specimen or in any other way alter a test
is considered a positive test under the Program.
1 1 7
3. Consequences of Positive Tests for a Prohibited Substance
If a player tests positive for any Prohibited Substance, the
MLHPAC informs the player's team of the positive result, the collection
date, and the substance for which the player tested positive.1 18 The team
is responsible for notifying the player of the positive test.1 9 The Minor
League DPT Program immediately places a player who tests positive on
what is called the "Administrative Track," and the player is subject to
discipline. Table 4 summarizes the disciplines the Program imposes on
players in specific circumstances. All suspensions are without pay.120 All
suspensions are entered into the "Baseball Information System" as a
suspension for a specified time period for violating the Minor League
DPT Program, which information may be made publicly available.
1 21
Any players on the Administrative Track for using a Drug of Abuse will
be evaluated for placement in a "Treatment Program" designed to
prevent them from using Drugs of Abuse in the future.
1 22
If a player voluntarily admits to using a Drug of Abuse before
being tested under the Program, that player may be placed on the
"Clinical Track," which is not available for players who have used a
Performance Enhancing Substance.1 23 A player on the Clinical Track is
not subject to discipline unless the player fails to comply with the Treat-
ment Program. 124 Any and all information relating to a player's involve-
ment with the Minor League DPT Program's Clinical Track shall be
disclosed only to the MLHPAC and the player's team, which must keep
the information confidential.
1 25
117 Id. at 6.
118 Id. at 6.
119 Id. at 2. The process of notification is different for Drugs of Abuse and
Performance Enhancing Substances. See infra notes 172 175 and accompanying
text.
120 Id. at 11.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 8-9.
123 Id. at 7.
124 Id. at 7-8.
125 Id. at 7.
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Table 4. Disciplines for Minor League Players Who Test Positive for
Use of Prohibited Substances
26
Offenses Failure to Comply Positive Test for Positive Test for
with Treatment Drug of Abuse Performance Enhancing
Program Substance
First 50-game suspension Enters the 50-game suspension
Administrative
Track and placed in
Treatment Program
Second 100-game 50-game suspension 100-game suspension
suspension
Third Permanent 100-game Permanent suspension
suspension suspension
Fourth NA Permanent NA
suspension
Possibility Yes, if MLHPAC Yes, if MLHPAC No
for concludes that a concludes that a
Reinstate player successfully player successfully
ment completed a completed a
after Treatment Program Treatment Program
Permanent and is no longer at and is no longer at
Suspensio risk to test positive risk to test positive
n? in the future in the future
Players who are convicted of, or plead guilty to, use of a Prohi-
bited Substance, or who are involved in the sale or distribution of a
Prohibited Substance are subject to punishment under the Minor League
DPT Program (see Table 5).127 In addition, if an employee of a MLB
team provides a player with a Prohibited Substance and the player tests
positive because he used it, then both the team and the employee are
subject to a minimum fine of $ 10,000.128
12 61 d. at 10-11.
127 Id. at 11.
128 Id. at 12.
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Table 5. Disciplines for Conviction for Use or Involvement in the
Sale of Prohibited Substances
129
Offenses Conviction for Use of Involvement in Sale orProhibited Substance Distribution
of Prohibited Substance
First Minimum 50-game suspension One-year game suspension
And $10,000 fine
Second At least a 100-game suspension Permanent suspension
Third Permanent suspension NA
The Minor League DPT Program also permits the MLB Com-
missioner to discipline a player for violating the Program in ways not
specifically stated in the Program. 13 Any MLB team that conceals or
fails to disclose to the MLB Commissioner's Office any information con-
cerning a player using, possessing, distributing, or selling a Prohibited
Substance shall be fined up to $2,000,000.3 This disclosure duty
includes any positive test results produced through a team-initiated and
administered drug-testing program.'32
4. The Appeal Process
The Minor League DPT Program allows a player to appeal a
positive test result in three situations:
If the player (1) has sufficient reason to believe that the chain-of-
custody of his sample was not properly administered pursuant to the
Program's requirements for collecting test specimens, which resulted in
an erroneous positive test result; (2) has sufficient reason to believe that
the laboratory did not properly administer the testing of the specimen,
which resulted in an erroneous positive test result; or (3) qualifies for a
"Therapeutic Use Exemption," which excuses, subject to certain condi-
tions, a positive test result caused by the player's use of a needed, pre-
scribed amphetamine. 133 Table 6 provides the criteria for the Therapeutic
Use Exemption in the Minor League DPT Program and WADA's
international standard for therapeutic use exemptions.
129 Id. at 11.131 Id. at 12.
131 Id. at 15.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 12.
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Table 6. Criteria for the Therapeutic Use Exemption (TUE)
Minor League DPT Program WADA International Standard on
TUE
135
The team's physician was aware of The Athlete should submit an
the player's use of the amphetamine application for a TUE no less than
prior to the player being tested. 21 days before participating in an
Event.
The player provides proper documen-
tation of the prescription that was
written either by or in consultation
with the team physician.
The player has received a proper
diagnostic evaluation completed by a
board-certified neurologist, board-
certified psychiatrist, or a licensed
psychologist familiar with the
diagnosis and treatment of
ADD/ADHD
The player would have serious The Athlete would experience a
adverse consequences if he stopped significant impairment to health if
taking the medication. the Prohibited Substance or
Prohibited Method were to be
withheld in the course of treating an
acute or chronic medical condition.
There are no reasonable alternatives There is no reasonable therapeutic
to the medication, alternative to the use of the
otherwise Prohibited Substance or
Prohibited Method.
The medication does not enhance the The therapeutic use of the Prohibited
player's performance more than if Substance or Prohibited Method
that player returned to normal health, would produce no additional
enhancement of performance other
than that which might be anticipated
by a return to a state of normal
health following the treatment of a
legitimate medical condition.
134 Id. at 12-13.
131 WADA, World Anti-Doping Code: International Standard for Therapeutic
Use Exemptions, 9 Jan. 2005, http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/
international standard.pdf.
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For an appeal to be considered, the player must submit a written
request stating the basis of the appeal within 48 hours of being informed
of the positive test result. 136 The player must send the written request by
overnight mail or fax to the MLB Commissioner's Office in New
York. 37 Any request for an appeal that (1) does not provide a sufficient
basis for an appeal, or (2) is received outside of the 48-hour appeal
window is automatically rejected. 138 The MLHPAC considers all appeals
requested by players under the Program within 72 hours of their submis-
sion. 3 9 The MLHPAC has three weeks after the appeal is submitted to
send the player a written decision. 141 If a player requests that his "B"
sample be tested to confirm that the laboratory erroneously tested his
"A" sample, the player must pay for the second test. However, if the "B"
sample does not confirm the "A" sample, the player will be
reimbursed. 141
5. The Institutional Framework
As noted above, the MLHPAC has the responsibility of administering
and overseeing the Minor League DPT Program. The MLHPAC has
three members: the medical representative of the MLB Commissioner's
Office and two other representatives, one of which must be a licensed
attorney. 4 2 MLB's Executive Vice President of Labor Relations and
Human Resources appoints or removes the MLHPAC's members.
4 3
MLHPAC's current members are Robert Manfred (MLB Vice President
for Labor Relations and Human Resources), Jennifer Gefsky (MLB
Deputy General Counsel), and Larry Westreich, M.D. (Consultant on
Drug Issues to the MLB Commissioner's Office). 144 Table 7 contains the
MLHPAC's duties and responsibilities under the Program.
136 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 3 1, at 14.
137 Id.
138 Id.
13 9 Id. at 14.
141 Id. at 15.
141 Id. at 14.
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Table 7. MLHPAC Duties and Responsibilities under the Minor
League DPT Program
145
1. Establish advisory groups, as
necessary, to help the effective
administration of the Program
2. Prepare and undertake educational
presentations supporting the
Program's objectives
3. Administer the Program's testing
requirements
4. Establish uniform guidelines and
requirements related to the Program
for the teams' Employee Assistance
Programs (EAPs) and monitor the
performance of all such EAPs
5. Conduct investigations
6. Determine a player's placement
on either the Clinical or
Administrative Track
7. Create, or participate in creating,
individualized treatment programs
for players in the Clinical Track
8. Monitor and supervise player's
treatment program progress
9. Establish, monitor, maintain, and
supervise the collection procedures
and testing protocols of the Program
10. Review periodically the
Program's operation and make
recommendations to the MLB
Commissioner's Office for
appropriate amendments
11. Take any and all other reasonable
actions necessary to ensure the
proper administration of the Program
Teams must create Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs),
which have various functions. For example, EAPs are responsible for
informing players when they test positive for a Drug of Abuse, 14 6 and
EAPs are involved in the flow of information among players, teams, and
the MLHPAC regarding the Program and its operation. The EAPs are
also involved in evaluating what kind of treatment program a player who
has used a Drug of Abuse should undergo and in monitoring the player's
progress in the treatment program selected.
147
141 Id. at 1-2.
146 Id. at 6.
147 Id. at 8.
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6. Concerns with the Minor League DPT Program
Although this article addresses problems with the drug preven-
tion and treatment program that MLB applies in Latin America, some
sense of the concerns that exist about the Minor League DPT Program
proves useful. These concerns often arise from comparisons of the Minor
League DPT Program against the Major League Joint DPT Program
(2006). One significant difference between these two Programs is that
the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) is the product of collective
bargaining negotiations between MLB and the MLBPA. The MLBPA's
involvement produced numerous substantive and procedural provisions
in the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) that are more protective
of players than the rules in the Minor League DPT Program. Minor
league players in the United States and Canada are not represented in
their dealings with MLB by any union or collective bargaining process,
so MLB unilaterally created and imposed the Minor League DPT
Program on minor league players without any involvement or input from
them. 148
Lisa Masteralexis, the Head of the Department of Sports
Management at the Isenberg School of Management of the University of
Massachusetts (Amherst) and who acts as an agent for U.S. minor league
players, described her experience with the Minor League DPT Program
in this way:
In the minor leagues, things are not that clear-cut
because players lack the protection of labor laws
afforded their unionized major league counterparts. My
own experience with the minor league policy was that I
was unable to gather information, I felt stonewalled by
the process set forth by the Commissioner's office, and I
found that my client was not given a fair and impartial
hearing to challenge the test results. When players do not
have a union, and with it the ability to bargain over drug
148 Larry Westreich, Remarks at the Reunion Anual de Scouts y Representantes
(May 12, 2006), Politica de Drogas para la Liga Profesional de Bisbol 2006,
at 2 (stressing that the Minor League DPT Program is a policy not negotiated
with any players' union) (on file with authors).
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testing, player concerns are left out when creating poli-
cies and procedures.
149
A few examples illustrate differences between the major league
and minor league programs that reflect the impact of collective bar-
gaining. Despite the risk to the game of baseball and the health of the
players being the same, the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) and
the Minor League DPT Program do not have identical lists of Prohibited
Substances. Prior to the changes to the Major League Joint DPT Program
(2002) agreed upon between MLB and the MLBPA in 2005, the major
league program covered a narrower range of Drugs of Abuse than the
minor league program .150 The Major League Joint DPT Program (2006)
broadened the scope of the definition of Drugs of Abuse, 51 but the latest
versions of the major league and minor league programs still are not
identical in terms of the provisions on Drugs of Abuse.
For example, the Minor League DPT Program includes as a
Drug of Abuse any drug or substance not listed on Schedule I or II but
that is similar in nature and cannot be lawfully (1) taken without a valid
prescription and has potential for abuse, or (2) obtained or used in the
United States. 152 The Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) does not
have this provision as part of its definition of Drug of Abuse. 153 Similar-
ly, the Minor League DPT Program states that its list of seven specific
149 Lisa P. Masteralexis, Drug Testing Provisions: An Examination of Dispari-
ties in Rules and Collective Bargaining Agreement Provisions, 40 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 775, 779 (2006).
150 The Major League Joint DPT Program (2002) defined Drugs of Abuse to be
any and all drugs or substances included on Schedule II of the U.S. Code of
Federal Regulations, as amended, and all Schedule I drugs listed in Addendum
B to the Program. Major League Joint DPT Program (2002), supra note 25, at 3.
The Minor League DPT Program defines Drugs of Abuse as any and all drugs or
substances in Schedules I and II of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations'
Schedule of Controlled Substances, as amended, excluding those substances
included as a Performance Enhancing Substance. Minor League DPT Program,
supra note 31, at 2.
151 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 3-4.
152 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 2.
153 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 3.
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Drugs of Abuse is a non-exhaustive list, 154 but the Major League Joint
DPT Program (2006) does not make this statement.
More broadly, the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) and
the Minor League DPT Program use different categories to divide up
Prohibited Substances. The Minor League DPT Program separates Pro-
hibited Substances into Drugs of Abuse and Performance Enhancing
Substances, 155 while the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006)
divides Prohibited Substances into Drugs of Abuse, Performance
Enhancing Substances, and Stimulants. 156 Under the Minor League DPT
Program, Performance Enhancing Substances are defined to include nine
categories of substances, including anabolic androgenic steroids, amphe-
tamine and its analogs, erythropoietin (EPO) and related compounds, and
diuretics and masking agents.1 57 The Major League Joint DPT Program
(2006) defines Performance Enhancing Substances only as anabolic
androgenic steroids covered by Schedule III of the Code of Federal
Regulations' Schedule of Controlled Substances.
158
The major and minor league programs differ at more detailed
levels as well. The non-exhaustive lists of anabolic androgenic steroids
in both programs are not identical. 159 The Minor League DPT Program
applies to prohomone nutritional supplements, insulin-like growth factors
(e.g., IGF-1), EPO, and diuretics and masking agents, none of which is
expressly covered by the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006). In
terms of EPO, the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) requires
assessment of samples collected in 2005 for the presence of EPO. The
154 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 2.
155 Id. at 2-5.
156 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 3-5.
157 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 3-5.
158 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 4.
159 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 3 4 (listing five anabolic
androgenic steroids (boldione, danazol, oxabolone, quinbolone, and 18a-homo-
17-hydroxyestr-4-en-3-one), which are not listed in the Major League Joint DPT
Program (2006); Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 4
5 (listing four items as anabolic androgenic steroids (clenbuterol, desoxy-
methyltestosterone, any salt, ester or ether of any listed item, and human growth
hormone) not listed in the Minor League DPT Program's non-exhaustive list of
anabolic androgenic steroids). The Minor League DPT Program lists clenbuterol
and HGH as Performance Enhancing Substances but not as anabolic androgenic
steroids. Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 4-5.
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results of this EPO assessment shall be reported to MLB and the
MLBPA, which "shall then determine the appropriate treatment of
EPO."16 ° With respect to diuretics or masking agents, the Major League
Joint DPT Program (2006) states that the presence of such substances in
a major league player's sample "shall result in the Player being re-tested"
and "shall be treated as a positive test result if the Independent Program
Administrator determines that the Player intended to avoid detection of
his use of a Prohibited Substance. 1 6'
Finally, Prohibited Substances may only be added to the Major
League Joint DPT Program (2006) by unanimous decision of the Health
Policy Advisory Committee (HPAC), which includes representatives
from both MLB and the MLBPA. 162 Under the Minor League DPT
Program, the MLHPAC can add Performance Enhancing Substances
unilaterally without input from minor league players.
163
In terms of testing, the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006)
subjects major league players to in-season, random, and reasonable-cause
testing for Performance Enhancing Substances and Stimulants. 164 Off-
season tests in the major leagues test only for the presence of Per-
formance Enhancing Substances but not for Stimulants or Drugs of
Abuse. 165 Under the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), major
league players cannot be subjected to testing for Drugs of Abuse, except
when the HPAC agrees by majority vote that reasonable cause exists to
test a player for use of such substances. 166 The Minor League DPT
Program subjects minor league players to mandatory in-season, off-
season, and reasonable-cause testing for all Prohibited Substances.
167
160 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 6.
161 Id. at 8.
162 Id. at 6. The only exception to this rule involves the addition by the U.S.
federal government of a substance to Schedules I, II, or III of the Code of
Federal Regulations' Schedules of Controlled Substances. Id.
163 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 2 3. See also Masteralexis,
supra note 149, at 788 ("The list at the minor league level is mandated from
above, whereas, at the major league level, the list is negotiated between union
and management.").
164 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 6-7.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 7.
167 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 5, 7.
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Institutionally, the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006)
empowers an Independent Program Administrator not affiliated with
MLB, any MLB team, or the MLBPA to be responsible for the schedu-
ling of tests. This Independent Program Administrator supervises the
collection process and the transportation of samples to a WADA-certi-
fled laboratory, oversees the laboratory, and reports positive test
results. 168 The Minor League DPT Program does not have a similar
independent entity that handles collection, testing, and reporting
responsibilities.
The differences in procedural rules between the Major League
Joint DPT Program and the Minor League DPT Program also illustrate
how the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) is more protective of
players' interests. The Major League Joint DPT Program (2006)
recognizes that a player may have good cause for failing to take a man-
datory test for Performance Enhancing Substances or Stimulants or
reasonable-cause testing for a Prohibited Substance.1 69 The Minor
League DPT Program deems any failure to take any test as a positive
result, potentially exposing the player to sanctions. It contains no
flexibility for a minor league player's failure to take a test for good
cause. 170
The procedures for notifying major and minor league players of
positive tests also differ. Under the Major League Joint DPT Program
(2006), the Independent Program Administrator immediately notifies
HPAC of a positive test result. HPAC must immediately notify both the
player and his team of the positive result.171 The Minor League DPT
Program has different, more complicated notification procedures for
positive test results involving Drugs of Abuse and Performance Enhan-
cing Substances. For Drugs of Abuse, the MLHPAC must immediately
notify the team's General Manager, Farm Director, and EAP of a
168 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 2 3; MLB,
MLBPA Announce New Drug Agreement, supra note 26.
169 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 8; see also
Masteralexis, supra note 149, at 788 ("Major league players can have a "good
cause" excuse for missing a test if they are not available at the time of the testing
and the committee deems it acceptable.").
170 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 6.
171 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 9.
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player's positive result. 172 The EAP then must inform the player. 173 After
a positive test for a Performance Enhancing Substance, MLHPAC must
immediately inform the team's General Manager and Farm Director of
the positive result and the discipline being imposed, either of whom may
inform, at his discretion, inform the LAP. 174 The General Manager or the
Farm Director must inform the player of the positive test result and the
discipline being imposed.
175
The standard for assessing whether a player violates the program
differs as between the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) and the
Minor League DPT Program. Under the Major League Joint DPT
Program (2006), a player does not violate the rules "if the presence of a
Prohibited Substance in his urine was not due to his fault or
negligence., 176 The MLB Commissioner's Office has the initial burden
of establishing that a player's sample tested positive pursuant to a valid
test,177 and then the player "has the burden of establishing that his test
result was not due to his fault or negligence."'1 78 The Minor League DPT
Program operates on the basis of strict liability. If a minor league
player's sample contains a Prohibited Substance, the player auto-
matically violates the rules and is subject to sanctions regardless of the
player's intent, fault, or negligence, subject to the limited grounds of
appeal (discussed earlier and again below). 179
The sanctions for violating each program also differ between the
major and minor leagues. 180 The Minor League DPT Program's sanctions
172 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 6.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 6-7.
176 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 19.
177 id.
178 Id. at 20.
179 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 12 (listing the limited grounds
for appeal); Westreich, supra note 148 (informing MLB scouts and team
representatives in Venezuela that the Minor League DPT Program "es una
politica de responsabilidad terminante "'). The proper term in Spanish for strict
liability is, however, responsabilidad absoluta.
180 The Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) contains tougher sanctions
than the Major League Joint DPT Program (2002), and these tougher sanctions
are responses to external pressure MLB and the MLBPA received in the 2002-
2005 period, including pressure from the U.S. Congress. Compare Major
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were described above.18 1 Table 8 compares the sanctions that the major
and minor league programs impose on players for failure to comply with
a Treatment Program. Table 9 compares the sanctions imposed for a
conviction for use of, or involvement in the sale of, Prohibited
Substances. Table 10 compares the major and minor league programs'
sanctions for testing positive for Prohibited Substances. These tables
reveal that the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) often applies
more lenient sanctions than the Minor League DPT Program. The gray-
shaded cells in Tables 8 10 indicate more lenient treatment at the major
league level.
For example, the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006)
contains no sanction provisions for testing positive for Drugs of Abuse
while the Minor League DPT Program imposes sanctions for the same
offense. Another example of more lenient sanctions involves a positive
test for amphetamines. Under the Minor League DPT Program, amphe-
tamines are Performance Enhancing Substances,' 82 the use of which
results in a 50-game suspension for the first positive test.1 83 Under the
Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), amphetamines are Stimu-
lants, 184 the use of which results in only follow-up testing for the first
positive test, and only a 25-game suspension for a second positive test.
85
The more lenient treatment of players under the Major League Joint DPT
Program (2006) is the direct result of the collective bargaining that
MLBPA undertakes on behalf of major league players.
League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 14 19, with Major League
Joint DPT Program (2002), supra note 25, at 11 15.181 See supra Tables 4 and 5.
182 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 4.
183 Id. at 11.
184 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 5.
185 Id. at 15. See Associated Press, Perez is First Player Disciplined for Testing
Positive for Stimulant, ESPN, July 7, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.coml/lb/news/
story?id-2927670 (reporting on the first MLB player suspended for testing
positive for a Stimulant under the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006)).
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Table 8. Comparison of Sanctions for Failure to Comply with
Treatment Program
186
Qffenses/ Minor League DPT Major League Joint DPT
Failure to Comply Program Program (2006)
First 50-game suspension At least a 15-game but not
more thlan a 25-gamel
suIspenlsionl
Second 100-game suspension At least a 25-game Kut not
mior-e thian a 50-gamie
Third Permanent At least a 50-game but not
suspension mior-e thian a75gmusspension
Fourth NA At least a one-year suspension
Beyond four NA M B Commissiner imposes
I'frter disciplinle onl play er-
conlsistenit w\ithi the conlcept of
progressivec disciplinec
Possibility for Yes, if MLHPAC NA




and is no longer at
risk to test positive in
the future
186 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 10; Major League Joint DPT
Program (2006), supra note 27, at 14-15.
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Table 9. Comparison of Sanctions for Conviction for Use of, or
Involvement in the Sale of, Prohibited Substances
87
Ojenses Conviction for Use of nvolvenent in Sale or Distribution of Prohibited
Prohibited Substance Substance
Major League Major League
Minor Pertormance Drugs of Abuse Minor League* Performance Drugs of Abuse
League* Enhancing (including a Enhancing (including a
Substance Stimulant) Substance Stimulant)
First Minimum 50- At least a 60-game A les a 15 One-year At leI a SQ A"tast I ()
game but not more than -ame buit in suspension and gm, ut not gamw bult
suspension 80-game ow than a 30 $10,000 fine more than 100 moie thana
suspension saespniogaesseiogimsuefio
Scond 100-game At least a 120- Permanent Permanent T year
suspension game but not more game but not suspension suspension from susefrion
than a one-year ha n a 9 major and minori
suspension gm Sp¢nsi league baseball
Third Permanent Permanent NA NA U to peranent
suspension suspension from s niupi from
maj or and minor aj1r and mnrl
league baseball league baseball
Fourth NA NA U 't p Inent NA NA NA
*Sanctions are the same for testing positive for Drugs of Abuse and Performance Enhancing Substances.
Table 10. Comparison of Sanctions for Testing Positive for
Prohibited Substance188
Offenses Minor League DPT Program Major League Joint DPT
Program (2006)
Drugs of Performance Performance Stimulants
Abuse Enhancing Enhancing
Substances Substances
First Enters 50-game 50-game Follow-up
Administrative suspension suspension testing
Track
Second 50-game 100-game 100-game
suspension suspension suspension suspension
187 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 11; Major League Joint DPT
Program (2006), supra note 27, at 16-17.
18' Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 10- 11; Major League Joint
DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 15.
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
Third 100-game Permanent Permanent 80game










Possibility Yes, if No Yes, at the No
for MLHPAC discretion of
reinstatement concludes that the MLB









Differences between the major and minor league programs also
appear in the appeal process. To begin, the Major League Joint DPT
Program (2006) subjects any determination that a player has violated its
rules, and any determination about the level of sanctions applied, to
review by the Arbitration Panel established by the Basic Agreement.'8 9
By contrast, the Minor League DPT Program does not permit the player
to appeal to a neutral party at any stage in the appeal proceedings. The
MLHPAC is the sole decision-maker under the minor league program,
and the MLHPAC is entirely composed of persons appointed by the
MLB Commissioner. Thus, the MLHPAC "may be seen as both
189 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 19; 2007-2011
Basic Agreement, Article XI (establishing Arbitration Panel) (on file with
authors).
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prosecutor and judge in minor league drug policy violations. '" 190 This
approach raises questions about whether the Minor League DPT Program
provides players with adequate due process.1 91 This concern is com-
pounded by the Minor League DPT Program's failure to provide players
and their legal representatives with complete information concerning
alleged violations.1 92 Further, players and the players' legal representa-
tives are not allowed to appear before the MLHPAC.
The Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) does not restrict
the grounds on which a player may challenge a positive test result. As
noted earlier, the initial burden rests with the MLB Commissioner's
Office to establish that a player tested positive pursuant to a valid test.
193
The MLB Commissioner's Office does not have to establish "intent,
fault, negligence, or knowing use of a Prohibited Substance on the
190 Masteralexis, supra note 149, at 780.
'9' WADA's World Anti-Doping Code requires, for example, that any athlete
accused of violating the Code be accorded a fair hearing, which includes, among
other things, a "fair and impartial hearing body". WADA, World Anti-Doping
Code (2003), supra note 11, at 24.
192 Masteralexis described her experience with the MLHPAC as follows:
In my experience representing the minor league player, I, too felt a
lack of due process. Due to the very short timeline for filing an
appeal, I called the committee [MLHPAC] on my client's behalf
before the forty-eight hours expired to give notice that I would be
faxing an appeal. One of the committee members responded, Don't
bother, he's guilty. In addition, I was told that the press release with
all those testing positive is done and will be going out in twenty
minutes. Since the policy states a player's positive test will be held
in abeyance until a decision of the connittee is made, I notified the
committee member that my client was within his right to appeal, that
until that appeal was filed that a decision on my client's case should
not be made, and that I expected my client's name to be removed
from the press release. I assume the press release went out with my
client's name on it as I saw Internet reports in which my client's
name was listed as testing positive, although the appeal was filed, no
decision had been returned in the case and according to the policy,
the testing information is to be confidential during the appeal.
Masteralexis, supra note 149, at 786.
193 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 19.
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Player's part to establish such a violation.', 194 Once the MLB Commis-
sioner's Office has met this initial burden, the player "then has the
burden of establishing that his test result was not due to his fault or
negligence., 195 To meet his burden, the player must provide objective
evidence that supports his claim. This evidence may, among other things,
"question the accuracy or reliability of the 'positive' test result."'1 96
By contrast, as discussed earlier,1 97 the Minor League DPT
Program severely restricts the grounds on which a player may appeal a
positive test finding. 198 Two of these grounds for appeal require the
player to have access to information about either the chain-of-custody of
his sample or the administration of sample testing at the laboratory. 199
The Minor League DPT Program provides the player with no additional
information about the positive test result that might be useful in utilizing
these grounds for appeal. As Lisa Masteralexis observed, these "two
bases of appeal are difficult to conduct discovery on because there is not
a collectively-bargained right to get access to documentation on either
the chain-of-custody or the lab procedures.,
200
The Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) has detailed
appeal provisions concerning appeal of a first positive test for Perfor-
mance Enhancing Substances or a second positive test for Stimulants. °1
The provisions lay out an automatic, highly structured, and transparent
process that reviews all information related to the first test results that
could produce game-suspension sanctions against a player. This process
operates without a player having to file a formal, written appeal in a very
short space of time, in contrast to the appeal process in the Minor League
DPT Program. In addition, the decision whether a test result is positive
within the meaning of the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) is
made together by the MLB Commissioner's Office and the MLBPA,
194 Id. at 19 20.
195 Id. at 20.
196 id.
197 See supra note 133 134 and accompanying text.
198 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 12 (limiting the player to
three grounds for appeal).
199 
Id.
200 Masteralexis, supra note 149, at 787.
201 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 20-21.
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assisted by their respective legal counsels. °2 Thus, the decision is not left
entirely in the hands of employees of the MLB Commissioner's Office,
as is the case with the Minor League DPT Program. The major league
appeal process includes an automatic testing of a player's "B" sample by
the Independent Program Administrator, which testing may be observed
by a representative of the player, the MLB Commissioner's Office, and
the MLBPA. °3
In addition, major league players do not have to pay in advance
for "B" samples to be tested, which contrasts with the Minor League
DPT Program's requirement that the appealing players pay for such
testing in advance.20 4 If an appeal is unsuccessful, the Minor League
DPT Program forces the player to pay for the costs associated with an
appeal.2 °5 The Major League Joint DPT Program imposes no penalty for
losing an appeal.2 6 Thus, the Minor League DPT Program creates
serious financial disincentives for minor league players to challenge
MLHPAC decisions.
The major league program's appeal process for a first positive
test for Performance Enhancing Substances or a second positive test for
Stimulants allows players to challenge any game-suspension penalty
imposed for a reported positive test.2°7 Players have three days from the
MLB Commissioner's notification of sanctions to be imposed to file a
grievance under the procedures established in the Basic Agreement.
Grievances "shall be automatically appealed to the Arbitration Panel., 20 8
As already noted, the Minor League DPT Program only allows players to
appeal to the MLHPAC, which is not an independent body. It is com-
posed entirely of MLB employees. In addition, the Minor League DPT
Program does not allow the players or their representatives to appear
before the MLHPAC as part of the appeal process, which contrasts with
players' rights to be present and represented in the appeal process of the
Major League Joint DPT Program (2006). The minor league approach
runs counter to the right the World Anti-Doping Code accords athletes to
202 Id. at 21.
203 Id. at 20.
204 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 14.
205 Id.
206 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 23.
207 Id. at 21.
208 Id.
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be present, and to be represented by counsel, before anti-doping agencies
reviewing alleged positive doping tests. 2°9 Under the Minor League DPT
Program, MLHPAC makes a decision on an appeal on the basis of only a
player's written appeal and the information the MLHPAC possesses,
which the MLHPAC is not required to provide to the player.
The time periods for the appeal process in the Major League
Joint DPT Program (2006) are also not as stringent as those in the Minor
League DPT Program. The Minor League DPT Program mandates that a
player file a written appeal with the MLB Commissioner's Office within
48 hours of being notified of a positive result and provides that any
request for an appeal received outside the 48-hour window is automa-
tically rejected.210 This short appeal window makes appeals difficult for
minor league players, even if they have the assistance of an agent or
lawyer.211 The Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) contains no
such draconian time limits in any of its provisions. Indeed, the Major
League Joint DPT Program allows a player to "challenge a positive test
result at any time on the basis of newly discovered scientific information
that questions the accuracy or reliability of the result., 212 A player may
challenge a result previously upheld by the Arbitration Panel.21 3
A final example of the differences between the major and minor
league programs involves the Therapeutic Use Exemption (TUE). Under
both programs, a TUE can be used to explain and justify a positive test,
but the Minor League DPT Program's TUE provisions are much more
restrictive than those in the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006). To
use a TUE under the Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), a sample
containing a Prohibited Substance will not be deemed positive if the
player was authorized to ingest the Prohibited Substance in question by a
valid, medically appropriate prescription provided by a duly licensed
physician.214 If the "issuing physician is not a Club physician (or one
designated by the Club to treat the Player), the Player ... shall notify the
209 WADA, World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 11, at 24.
210 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 13.
211 See, e.g., Masteralexis, supra note 149, at 786 (describing her frustrations
with trying to file an appeal on behalf of a minor league player within the 48-
hour period).
212 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 22.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 8.
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Player's Club Physician of the existence of the prescription prior to the
sample being taken., 215 The Major League Joint DPT Program (2006)
does not limit the Prohibited Substances or the medical conditions for
which TUEs may be used, nor does it require players to apply for TUEs
prior to being tested.
By contrast, as noted earlier,216 the TUE provisions in the Minor
League DPT Program seriously limit the availability of TUEs to positive
217tests for amphetamines prescribed for the treatment of ADD/ADHD .
In addition, the Minor League DPT Program only recognizes a TUE for
purposes of appealing a positive test when the appealing player had
submitted a TUE application before the test was conducted.218 Further,
the Minor League DPT Program empowers the MLHPAC to make all
decisions on therapeutic use exemptions; 2 19 whereas, under the major
league program, the Independent Program Administrator determines
whether a positive test should be excused under a TUE.2 °
In addition to differing significantly from the major league
program, the minor league approach contradicts WADA's guidance on
how national anti-doping organizations should handle TUE exemptions.
Under WADA's International Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions,
national anti-doping organizations must establish a Therapeutic Use
Exemption Committee (TUEC), which makes all decisions related to the
availability of therapeutic use exemptions. Such Committees "should
include at least three physicians with experience in the care and
treatment of Athletes and a sound knowledge of clinical, sports and
exercise medicine.22 1 MLHPAC only has one physician. Further,
WADA's International Standard provides that, "[in order to ensure a
level of independence of decision, a majority of the members of the
TUEC should not have any official responsibility in the Anti-doping
215 Id.
216 See supra notes 214 215 and accompanying text.
217 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 11 12.
2 18 Id. at 12.
2 19 Id. at 13.
220 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at 9.
221 WADA, World Anti-Doping Code: International Standard for Therapeutic
Use Exemptions, supra note 135, at 11.
222 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 1.
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organization.'" 223 All the members of MLHPAC serve in official capa-
cities for MLB,224 meaning that the MLHPAC contains no members who
are independent of the MLB Commissioner's Office.
These differences between the major league and minor league
programs help illustrate why concerns have been raised about the Minor
League DPT Program's fairness to minor league players. Under the
Minor League DPT Program, the substantive rules (e.g., the scope of
Prohibited Substances) and the procedural provisions (e.g., the appeals
process) are unilaterally imposed, much stricter in application, and more
unforgiving in terms of process for minor league players-all in a
context where none of the players have union assistance and only some
of them have agents to help them navigate the system.
The Minor League DPT Program is probably even more
daunting for Latin players in the minor leagues in the United States and
Canada. These Latin players face language, educational, and cultural
barriers that players from the United States and Canada do not confront.
With 46.2% of all minor league players being foreign-born in 2007,225
and the vast majority of these hailing from Latin American countries, the
disadvantages facing Latin minor leaguers in the United States with
respect to the Minor League DPT Program deserves some attention from
MLB. Indeed, the statistics provided earlier,2 26 showing that Latin minor
and major league players were disproportionately represented in positive
drug tests and suspensions in 2005 and 2006, indicate that more attention
for Latin players is needed not only in the minor leagues in the United
States but also in the Major League Joint DPT Program.
Given the threat to the health of players and the integrity of the
game created by PED use, serious substantive and procedural rules are
needed to deter and punish use. However, the serious consequences to a
player's professional and personal life of positive drug tests under the
Major League Joint DPT Program (2006) and the Minor League DPT
Program underscore the importance of transparency, education, and
21 WADA, World Anti-Doping Code: International Standard for Therapeutic
Use Exemptions, supra note 135, at 11.
124 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 1.225 Associated Press, National Pastime Takes on International Flavor, ESPN,
Apr. 3, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id-2824295.
226 See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15:2
FIGHTING BASEBALL DOPING IN LATIN AMERICA
adequate due process. Anti-doping strategies need to be not only
effective and cost-efficient but also fair.
However, the problems that Latin major and minor league
players in North America face are not the focus of this article. We raise
these problems as important background for the following analysis of the
ways in which MLB applies the Minor League DPT Program in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela. The issues that might arise with
Latin minor leaguers in North America vis-&'-vis the Minor League DPT
Program pale in comparison to the difficulties created by the manner in
which MLB approaches drug testing in its most important foreign
markets for baseball talent.
B. Overview of the Latin Summer League DPT Program
As noted earlier, the Minor League DPT Program serves as the
template for the Latin Summer League DPT Program. In other words,
MLB took the program designed for application to minor league players
in the United States and Canada, made some minor adjustments, and
applied it to minor league players in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela. As we argue below, this strategy creates serious problems
that MLB should address by more appropriate tailoring of its drug-testing
program to the realities of minor league baseball in Latin America.
The term "Latin Summer League DPT Program" is misleading
because MLB's application of the Minor League DPT Program in its
Latin minor league operations is not uniform. As observed above, MLB
does not apply the Latin Summer League DPT Program the same way in
the Dominican Republic and in Venezuela. The difference is the lack of
sanctions for Dominican minor leaguers who test positive for use of
Prohibited Substances. MLB claims that Dominican law prevents it from
applying drug-related suspensions to Dominican players under minor
league contracts with MLB teams.2  Thus, the lack of sanctions for
Dominican players eliminates a critical feature of the drug-testing
strategy from Dominican minor league operations.
The application of the sanctions in Venezuela gives Venezuela
the distinction of being the target of "MLB's most complete and punitive
drug sweep ever carried out on foreign soil.' 228 Thus, many of the
227 Mike Fish, Activist: MLB Should Keep Promise to Test Prospects, ESPN,
Feb. 14, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id-2763304.
228 Baker, Growing Pains, supra note 43.
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problems discussed in this part of the article arise from cases in
Venezuela in which MLB has fully applied the Latin Summer League
DPT Program.
C. Evaluation of the Latin Summer League DPT Program
In this section, we work through each part of the Latin Summer
League DPT Program to demonstrate where MLB exacerbates problems
for Latin minor league players and where the Program contains inade-
quate provisions given the nature of the PED problem in the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela. As this analysis proceeds, the importance of the
"dangerous cocktail" of poverty, children, buscones, different regulatory
contexts, and PEDs returns to inform our critique of MLB's approach.
1. Objective of the Latin Summer League DPT Program
The objective of the Latin Summer League DPT Program is to
prevent and end the use of Prohibited Substances by non 40-man roster
players participating in the Summer Leagues because the MLB Commis-
sioner concluded that use of Prohibited Substances may both be hazar-
dous to players' health and give players unfair competitive advantages on
the playing field.229 This objective, and the reasons behind it, is identical
to the one stated in the Minor League DPT Program.23°
The first concern with this objective is its scope. The objective
singles out minor league players participating in the Summer Leagues,
which run from May to August in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela. The Summer Leagues are for entry-level players and consist
of games between the minor league teams of the MLB clubs that have
operations in Latin America. The Summer Leagues are important venues
for MLB teams to evaluate Latin minor league talent. However, rosters
for Summer League teams may not include all minor league players that
are under contract with MLB teams. In the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela, MLB teams operate year-round minor league facilities called
baseball academies. Often, MLB teams have players under minor league
contracts who do not play in the Summer Leagues. Therefore, the Latin
Summer League DPT Program does not apply to all Latin minor league
players. By contrast, the Minor League DPT Program applies to all
minor league players who are under contract with MLB teams.
219 Latin Summer League DPT Program, supra note 44.
230 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 1.
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The objective of the Latin Summer League DPT Program also
reveals that the program does not apply to Latin prospects who have yet
to sign minor league contracts with MLB teams. Understandably, MLB
argues that it should not be responsible for testing all prospects working
with or without buscones in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela who
have not signed minor league contracts. Critics of MLB's drug-testing
approach in Latin America, such as Fernando Mateo, complain the MLB
is turning a blind-eye to the rampant PED use that occurs before a
231prospect signs a minor league contract.
This complaint connects back to the concerns raised about how
buscones often provide PEDs to prospects they groom for tryouts with
MLB teams. MLB argues that it is not responsible for the regulation of
buscones because they are not employees of MLB teams. 232 MLB teams
do subject some players who have signed minor league contracts to
medical examinations, which may include drug testing,2 33 but this
practice is not uniform among all MLB teams. However, the application
of drug testing in the Summer Leagues may have the perverse effect of
making PED use worse in the period before a prospect signs a minor
league contract. The drug-testing regimen creates incentives for buscones
and prospects to use PEDs to land the minor league contracts and
coveted signing bonuses.
Both MLB and its critics make valid points about the pre-
contract PED problem, especially as exacerbated by buscones, but the
problem remains unaddressed. MLB is correct that it should not have to
test every prospect for a minor league contract in the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela, but it can craft a more effective approach that
responds constructively to the nature of the PED problem in these
countries. This approach would involve mandatory testing for all
prospects signed to minor league contracts.
Given that some MLB teams already subject prospects who sign
contracts to drug testing, applying this approach across the Latin minor
league system would harmonize an existing strategy. The sanction for a
positive drug test would be either, at each team's discretion, (1) ter-
mination of the contract, or (2) no signing bonus. The testing should be
231 Farrey, supra note 45; Fish, Steroid Problem Reaches Critical Mass in the
D.R., supra note 49.
232 Svrluga, supra note 89.
233 Fish, Activist: MLB Should Keep Promise to Test Prospects, supra note 227.
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standardized and regulated under MLB's control to prevent teams from
manipulating test results simply to deny signing bonuses. Any positive
test at signing would count as the player's first offense under the Latin
Summer League DPT Program, meaning the next positive test produces
the sanctions described in the Program for second offenses.
The termination of the contract or the denial of a signing bonus
would send the right economic signals downstream to buscones, pros-
pects, and parents. The economic incentives that exist for PED use pre-
contract would decline significantly because a positive test would
generate such adverse economic consequences for all those with a stake
in the signing bonus. This strategy will not entirely eliminate the PED
problem because buscones could become more sophisticated at using
PEDs to avoid positive tests at signing. However, the strategy would
raise the stakes and risks associated with PED use by minor league
prospects, thereby having a deterrent effect that would contribute to the
overall objective of preventing and terminating PED use in MLB's Latin
minor league operations.
In addition, MLB could institute a system under which prospects
signing minor league contracts would be required to disclose whether
they worked with a buscon prior to signing, and if so provide the name
and contact information for his buscon. If a prospect using a buscon
tested positive for use of a PED after signing a minor league contract,
MLB would issue a warning to the buscon in question that any other
positive post-signing test by any of his prospects will result in a
permanent ban on MLB teams signing prospects trained by him.
Although MLB does not directly control buscones, MLB can regulate
how MLB teams interact with buscones, which gives MLB tremendous
power to regulate constructively behavior by buscones that threatens the
integrity of the game and the health and welfare of children and young
men.
2. The Minor League Health Policy Advisory Committee (MLHPAC)
The Latin Summer League DPT Program has exactly the same
MLHPAC, which has exactly the same responsibilities, as the one in the
Minor League DPT Program.234 Incredibly, MLB made no changes to
MLHPAC and this key institution's activities for purposes of addressing
the PED problem in MLB's Latin minor league operations. The
234 Latin Summer League DPT Program, supra note 44, at 1-2.
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Dominican Republic and Venezuela are MLB's two biggest markets for
foreign talent, and are the markets in which PED use has been identified
as a serious problem. Despite these facts, the Latin Summer League DPT
Program establishes a MLHPAC with no personnel resident in, or with
expertise about, these Latin American countries. Nor does the Latin
Summer League DPT Program give MLB's office in the Dominican
Republic any official role in administering and overseeing the
Program.
235
Having the same MLHPAC with the same members may serve
the purpose of making policies for all minor league DPT programs
consistent. However, as we argued above,236 the environments affecting
PED use in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela are so different from
the situation in the United States and Canada that utilizing the same
MLHPAC makes little sense, unless MLB is simply avoiding the costs it
would incur to take the PED problem in Latin America as seriously as
the one in the minor leagues in North America. The socio-economic
differences, the heavy MLB interest in children as prospects, the impact
of buscones, and the different regulatory environments for pharma-
ceutical and nutritional products combine to underscore the need for the
key institution overseeing the Latin Summer League DPT Program to
have more direct connection with the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela.
Surprisingly, given how significant Latin America is as a source
of foreign baseball talent, MLB has not built much of an institutional
foundation in the Dominican Republic or Venezuela on which to base
more robust involvement. Despite MLB teams recruiting players and
operating baseball academies in the Dominican Republic for decades,
MLB only opened its office in the Dominican Republic in 2000 in
response to criticism about the behavior of MLB teams in Latin
America.237 Although the office is responsible for overseeing MLB
activities in Latin America, it is staffed by only five employees. Two are
administrative assistants, and one employee is responsible for
235 The MLB office in the Dominican Republic is involved in aspects of the
Latin Summer League DPT Program, but the Program itself neither mentions
this office nor assigns it formal responsibilities.
236 See supra Part III.B.
237 MARCANO & FIDLER, STEALING LIVES, supra note 80, at 179-181.
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238
administrative oversight and financial matters. MLB has no offices or
employees in Venezuela. In essence, MLB has tasked two professional
staff members to oversee all MLB issues in both the Dominican Republic
and Venezuela. MLB's offices in Tokyo (4 professionals) and London (3
professionals) have staffs larger than the professional staff in the MLB
office in the Dominican Republic. 239 Astonishingly, MLB does not even
include its Dominican Republic office in the list of international offices
240that MLB maintains on its website.
The lack of MLB's institutional commitment to the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela has real significance for the anti-PED effort in
these countries. Earlier we noted MLB's claim that is has spent "literally
millions of dollars" on educating Dominican baseball players about the
drug-testing program and the dangers of PED use. With only two full-
time professional staff in the Dominican Republic who have no formal
role in the Latin Summer League DPT Program, and with none of the
members of the MLHPAC being resident or based in the Dominican
Republic, on what exactly did MLB spend these millions of dollars? To
answer this question, MLB should release audited accounts that show in
detail what MLB spends on anti-PED activities in the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela. We suspect that such accounts would demon-
strate that MLB has not spent millions of dollars on educating people in
the Dominican Republic about its drug-testing program.
The key point is that MLB is missing a tremendous opportunity
to involve stakeholders in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela
through the Latin Summer League DPT Program and the MLHPAC in its
anti-PED efforts. Involving Dominicans and Venezuelans worried about
the PED problem in their countries could help MLB spread the word
about its strategy, program, and objectives. 241 The governments of both
238 Oficina Major League Baseball Republica Dominicana, Informacion General
(on file with authors).




241 The pro-active involvement of Chicago White Sox manager and native
Venezuelan Ozzie Guillen in making public service announcements for MLB's
use in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela is a step in the right direction,
even if it was Guillen, not MLB, who expressed concern about the lack of
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the Dominican Republic and Venezuela signed the Copenhagen
Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sports,24 2 so political leaders in both
countries have expressed awareness about, and commitment to addres-
sing, the PED problem in sports. The involvement of children in MLB's
Latin American recruiting and drug-testing program calls for higher
standards of protection than apply in the minor leagues in the United
States and Canada, where the players are older and more educated.
Unfortunately, MLB's establishment of the MLHPAC for the Latin Su-
mmer League DPT Program demonstrates a singular lack of appreciation
for the realities in these countries and a lack of imagination regarding
ways to harness Dominican and Venezuelan input to make the anti-PED
campaign more powerful and sustainable for the sake of the health and
welfare of Latin children and young men.
3. Rules on Prohibited Substances
The Latin Summer League DPT Program states the following:
Although many drugs are available both over-the-
counter and with a prescription in other countries, the
Venezuelan [and Dominican] Summer League Drug
Testing Program is based on the drug laws of the United
States. Therefore, despite the fact that certain drugs may
be lawful in other countries, a player will be penalized
according to this Program. In other words, a player's
excuse that his positive test is the result of either a
lawful over-the-counter product or a lawful prescription
will not be a valid defense under the Program. 43
information Latin players were receiving. See Melkin, supra note 62. Broader
and deeper involvement of other caring and committed Dominicans and
Venezuelans is, however, possible. See also POUND, INSIDE DOPE: How DRUGS
ARE THE BIGGEST THREAT TO SPORTS, WHY YOU SHOULD CARE, AND WHAT
CAN BE DONE ABOUT THEM, supra note 30, at 225 227 (stressing the
importance of seeking partners in the battle against PEDs).
242 WADA, Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sports: List of Signa-
tories, supra note 17.
243 Latin Summer League DPT Program, supra note 44, at 2. The only similar
warning in the Minor League DPT Program states that "a player may test
positive for a Schedule III steroid from taking an over-the-counter supplement.
This is especially true for nutritional supplements purchased outside the United
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This warning in the Latin Summer League DPT Program
connects to one factor that contributes to the PED problem in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela the differences in regulation of
pharmaceutical and related products.244 MLB's approach to reducing and
eliminating the PED problem in its North and Latin American minor
league operations would be weakened if it applied three different lists of
Prohibited Substances based on what products are lawful in the United
States, Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. Rather than using U.S. law
as the basis for harmonization, MLB could have used the prohibited list
generated by WADA.2 45 Nevertheless, the choice of U.S. law as the basis
for harmonized standards has consequences that the Latin Summer
League DPT Program should confront more forthrightly.
The Latin Summer League DPT Program contains lists of Drugs
of Abuse and Performance Enhancing Substances similar but not
identical to the lists in the Minor League DPT Program.2 46 However,
these lists do not identify those substances that are on the list of
controlled substances in U.S. law but that are legally available in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela. Nor is there, apparently, a list of
what players could take and not test positive under the Program.24 7 Such
States." Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 4. The Latin Summer
League DPT Program contains the same language. Latin Summer League DPT
Program, supra note 44, at 4. Given the significant numbers of Latin players in
the minor league system in North America, the Minor League DPT Program
should contain more information and warnings about national differences and
practices that could get a Latin or foreign player into trouble with the Program.
244 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.245 WADA, Prohibited List, http://www.wada-ama.org/en/prohibitedlist.ch2.
246 Compare Latin Summer League DPT Program, supra note 44, at 2-4 with
Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 3-5. The Minor League DPT
Program and the Latin Summer League DPT Program have the same list of
Drugs of Abuse, but, in terms of Performance Enhancing Drugs, the Minor
League DPT Program lists more anabolic androgenic steroids (boldione,
oxabolone, quinbolone, and 1 8a-homo- 1 7-hydroxyestr-4-en-3 -one), insulin-like
growth factors (e.g., IGF-1), and miscellaneous anabolic agents (e.g.,
clenbuterol, zeranol, and zilpaterol) not found in the 2006 version of the Latin
Summer League DPT Program.
247 Gordon, supra note 60 (quoting Ram6n Fereira, director or operations of the
Venezuelan Summer League, stating "[there's no list of what players can take.
At least I don't have it.").
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lists, which would not be difficult to compile with input from Dominican
and Venezuelan experts, would provide more transparency and clarity for
the warning the Latin Summer League DPT Program gives concerning
use of legally available drugs in other countries.
Basing the lists of Prohibited Substances on U.S. law, as amen-
ded, raises the importance of MLB immediately notifying minor league
players subject to its drug-testing programs of such changes. Neither the
Minor League nor the Latin Summer League DPT Program contains any
obligation on MLB or the MLHPAC to provide such information to
minor league players in a timely fashion. This notification is particularly
important for Latin minor leaguers, who will be the least likely to have
any idea that the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations on Controlled
Substances has been amended. The same duty of immediate notification
should exist when MLHPAC exercises its prerogative to add Prohibited
Substances to the list. WADA's World Anti-Doping Code supports this
notification principle when it states that drug-testing programs need to
ensure that the participants receive updated and accurate information
related to, among other things, the list of prohibited substances.
2 48
Transparency, clarity, and notification are critical for the Latin
minor leagues because children living in poor socio-economic circum-
stances are the ones largely involved in this process. The Minor League
and Latin Summer League DPT Programs are difficult, complex docu-
ments. Even highly trained legal and sports professionals have difficulty
with them. Thorough and repeated information, training, and education
about the Prohibited Substances, and other aspects of the Latin Summer
League DPT Program are critical to successfully reducing PED use.
The statistics recording the number of Dominican and Venezu-
elan players testing positive for PED use suggests that MLB has not been
doing a good job fulfilling its responsibilities on education. Investigative
reporting in Venezuela also indicates that MLB has done a poor job
providing clear and transparent information to minor league players in
that country. Geoff Baker of the Seattle Times investigated the stories of
Venezuelan players suspended for testing positive but who had little
249knowledge or understanding about the Summer League DPT Program.None of the players Baker interviewed had ever seen or received a copy
248 WADA, World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 11, at 50.
249 Baker, Growing Pains, supra note 43.
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250
of the Program, in any language. Ian Gordon of ESPN found the same
situation in his report on the impact of the drug-testing program in
Venezuela in 2007.251 Ivan Gonzalez, a Venezuelan journalist, inter-
viewed Dr. Pedro Delgado, who identified himself as a consultant to
MLB who gives once-a-year talks on behalf of the MLHPAC at MLB
baseball academies in Venezuela on the Latin Summer League DPT
25Program. 52 Delgado, who is apparently the only person retained by MLB
to engage in part-time PED education in Venezuela, admitted that he did
not know much about critical aspects of the Program, such as the process
by which samples are taken from players and the appeal process. 253 From
his investigations, Gonzalez concluded that players in the Venezuela
Summer League "are not getting any guidance about what they should do
in order to stay clean.
254
When asked by Geoff Baker about the apparent lack of knowl-
edge among Venezuelan players about the Latin Summer League DPT
Program, MLB vice president and MLHPAC member Robert Manfred
blamed the players for their ignorance, "saying players can't sit back and
expect information to be handed to them. After all, they are the ones
testing positive. ,255 Manfred continued: "At some point, the fundamen-
tals are that it's the player's responsibility to stay informed. They know
there's a policy. They know it's out there. And if they don't know the
details, then it's up to them to find that out., 256 Manfred told ESPN that
"administrators are instructed to pass out both English and Spanish
copies of the drug policy., 257 He then stated, "Did I physically see that
happen? No, but I know it is supposed to happen.,
258
As a member of MLHPAC, Manfred has the responsibility to
educate and inform Latin minor league players about the Latin Summer
250 Id.
251 Gordon, supra note 60 (reporting that many Venezuelan coaches and players
told him that they had never seen the drug policy document in any language).
252 Ivan Gonzalez, Dopaje afecta carrera dejovenes peloteros, EL MUNDO, Oct.
23, 2006, at 5.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Baker, Growing Pains, supra note 43.
256 Id.
257 Gordon, supra note 60.
258 id.
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League DPT Program.259 The duties and responsibilities of the MLHPAC
in the Latin Summer League DPT Program include preparing and under-
taking educational presentations that support the Program's objectives
and taking any and all other reasonable actions necessary to insure the
proper administration of the Program. Manfred's responses to reporters'
inquiries are disturbing. Is Manfred seriously arguing that children, who
make up the vast majority of minor league players in these countries,
some of whom are illiterate, and most of whom have little formal
education and live in poor socio-economic conditions, are responsible for
finding out the details of the Latin Summer League DPT Program
because "they know there is a policy?" Is it an acceptable standard that
educational efforts are "supposed to happen?" This attitude fails not only
to appreciate the context in which MLB is implementing its Latin drug-
testing program but also to draw on international best practices on anti-
doping education programs, such as those emphasized by WADA.260
4. Random, Off-Season, and Reasonable Cause Testing
The Minor League DPT Program and the Latin Summer League
DPT Program are virtually identical in their provisions on random testing
(including off-season testing) and reasonable cause testing for use of
Prohibited Substances.261 See Table 11.
259 Latin Summer League DPT Program, supra note 44, at 1, 2.
261 WADA, World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 11, at 50; WADA, Model
Guidelines for Core Information/Education Programs to Prevent Doping in
Sport, (2005), http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/EDUMODEL_
GUIDELINESEn.pdf.
261 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 4-5, 6; Latin Summer League
DPT Program, supra note 44, at 5-7.
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Table 11. Random and Reasonable Cause Testing in the Minor
League and Latin Summer League DPT Programs
262
3. Random Testing
A. Drugs of Abuse
1. In addition to the testing set forth in Section 4 below, all Players will be
subject to four unannounced tests per year for the use of any Drug of Abuse. If a
Player tests positive for a Drug of Abuse, MLHPAC may subject that Player to
additional testing beyond the four tests per year generally required under the
Program.
2. If a Player tests positive for any Drug of Abuse, he shall immediately enter
the Administrative Track and shall be subject to the discipline set forth in
Section 8 below.
B. Performance Enhancing Drugs
1. In addition to the testing set forth in Section 4 below, all Players will be
subject to up to four unannounced tests per year for the use of Performance
Enhancing Substances. If a Player tests positive for a Performance Enhancing
Substance, MLHPAC may subject that Player to additional testing beyond the
four tests per year generally required under the Program.
2. If a Player tests positive for any Performance Enhancing Substance, he shall
immediately enter the Administrative Track and shall be subject to the discipline
set forth in Section 8 below.
C. Off-Season Testing
All Players will be subject to random, unannounced tests during the off-season.
Players are responsible for ensuring that the Office of the Commissioner has the
Player's most recent contact information (e.g., home phone number, cell phone
number and address) and the dates for which a Player may not be reachable. If
the Office of the Commissioner attempts to test a Player during the off-season
but is unable to contact the Player using the information provided by the Player,
Player will be charged with a "positive" drug test and will be disciplined in
accordance with Section 8 of the Program.
262 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 5; Latin Summer League DPT
Program, supra note 44, at 5-7.
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[Latin Summer League DPT Program:] Players should contact Chris Guinty at
the Center for Drug Free Sports to provide updated or changed contact
information. Chris can be reached at (816)474-8655 x121 or
cguinty(kdrugfreesport.com.
[Minor League DPT Program:] Players should contact the Center for Drug Free
Sports either by phone at (877) 677-4287, ext. 114 or by e-mail at [sic] to
provide updated or changed off-season contact information.
4. Reasonable Cause Testing
In the event that any MLHPAC member has information that gives him/her
reasonable cause to believe that a Player has, in the previous year, engaged in
the use, possession or distribution of a Prohibited Substance, such member shall
immediately request a meeting (or conference call) to present this information to
the other MILHPAC members. Upon hearing the information presented,
MLHPAC may either immediately determine if there is reasonable cause to
believe that the Player has engaged in the use, possession, or distribution of a
Prohibited Substance or MLHPAC may conduct a prompt investigation to
ascertain certain facts. If MLHPAC determines that such reasonable cause
exists, the Player will be subject to immediate testing in accordance with the
procedures and protocols set forth in Addendum A hereto.
The off-season testing rules raise special concerns for Latin
players whether they play in the North American or Latin American
minor league system. However, the concerns are most acute with those
who play minor league ball in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela,
which is our focus. The Minor League DPT Program and Latin Summer
League DPT Program provide that, if the MLB Commissioner's Office is
unable to contact the player using information provided by him, the
Program charges the player with a "positive" drug test and will subject
him to sanctions.26 3 This approach seems overly harsh because it exposes
a player to potentially career-ruining sanctions and stigma because the
MLB Commissioner's Office was not able to contact him. The punish-
ment is the same in this context as when a player refuses to take a
random test during the season. The rule provides no flexibility for
263 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 5; Latin Summer League DPT
Program, supra note 44, at 5.
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malfunctions or inefficiencies in the communications systems in
Venezuela or the Dominican Republic. The rule also fails to account for
players who may need to be away from their homes for family
emergencies or other unexpected reasons having nothing to do with
nefarious PED use.
Without undermining the importance of off-season testing, the
Minor League DPT Program and Latin Summer League DPT Program
could apply rules that was more even-handed in their effect on players.
For example, players could be provided with the opportunity to show that
they were in fact available through the contact information provided or
they had good cause for not being reachable at the time the MLB
Commissioner's Office attempted to contact them. In addition, the rules
could limit players to one "good cause" excuse for off-season testing in
order to prevent abuse of the additional flexibility.
The rules could more be more fair for players if the Minor
League DPT Program and Latin Summer League DPT Program allowed
Latin players to contact their teams, an official representative of MLB, or
the MLHPAC in their home countries about changes in their contact
information or their availability. The rules currently require the player to
ensure that the MLB Commissioner's Office has his most recent contact
information and the dates for which a player may not be reachable.2 64
The rules provide that a player should call or e-mail the National Center
for Drug Free Sport, Inc. in Kansas City, Missouri265 to provide updated
or changed contact information.2 66
The National Center for Drug Free Sport acts as the agent for
MLB in connection with drug-testing that occurs under the Minor
League DPT Program and the Latin Summer League DPT Program. The
necessity of forcing Dominican and Venezuelan children and young men,
many of whom have no access to e-mail, cell phones, or inexpensive
international telephone services, to call the United States to update
contact information is not clear. More efficient and perhaps effective
would be to establish official contact points in the Dominican Republic
264 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 5; Latin Summer League DPT
Program, supra note 44, at 5.
265 National Center for Drug Free Sport, Inc., http://www.drugfreesport.com/
index.asp.
266 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 6; Latin Summer League DPT
Program, supra note 44, at 5.
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and Venezuelan to facilitate better flows of contact (and other forms of)
information.
Under the Program, each MLB team must have an Employee
Assistance Program (EAP), which could serve as the conduit for contact
information for off-season testing, or MLHPAC could establish focal
points in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela for the transfer of
information critical to making off-season testing (and other parts of the
Program) function effectively and fairly. MLB's failure to establish any
administrative capabilities or resources in these countries for the Latin
Summer League DPT Program makes the single focal point strategy
currently unfeasible.
5. Collection Procedures
The procedures under which MLB collects test samples from
players are almost identical under the Minor League DPT Program and
the Latin Summer League DPT Program.267 A problem that arises under
these collection procedures in the Latin Summer League DPT Program is
that MLB is often subjecting children (i.e., players under 18 years of age)
to the collection of testing samples. The need to have higher standards of
care when children are being subjected to drug testing regimes is empha-
sized by WADA. In its Model Rules, WADA provides that "[tfesting
under these Anti-Doping Rules may only be conducted on a Minor where
a Person with legal responsibility for that Minor has given prior
consent.,
268
The Latin Summer League DPT Program fails to respect this
internationally recognized principle concerning drug testing for child
athletes. In fact, this age-of-consent problem raises other concerns with
the Program. For example, the Program includes forms players must sign
267 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at Addendum A; Latin Summer
League DPT Program, supra note 44, at Addendum A. The Minor League DPT
Program has added some additional language regarding incomplete specimens
as well as a Policy for Partial Urine Specimens dated March 1, 2006. Minor
League DPT Program, supra note 31, at Addendum A. Although not found in
the 2006 version of the Latin Summer League DPT Program, MLB could be
applying the same rules on partial or incomplete specimens in both North and
Latin America.
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that authorize the release of medical information to MLHPAC and team
management. 269 The authorization forms do not contain any acknowl-
edgement that parents or legal guardians of players under 18 also should
sign such forms. MLB teams must get parental or legal guardian consent
to sign children to minor league contracts, 270 and the same principle
should apply to the legal forms and administrative procedures of the
Latin Summer League DPT Program.
The lack of any attention to the issue of applying a drug testing
program to children is significant in a context in which MLB teams seek
to recruit, sign, and train players as young as possible. Children are the
target of MLB teams' efforts in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.
MLB must shoulder the responsibilities created by seeking to deal legally
and commercially with children. WADA has promulgated the interna-
tionally recognized standard of parental or legal guardian consent that
should also guide the administration of the Latin Summer League DPT
Program.
6. Testing Protocols
The protocols used for testing whether a sample is positive are
identical in the Minor League DPT Program and the Latin Summer
League DPT Program.271 The main issue with the testing protocols from
the perspective of Latin minor league players concerns Performance
Enhancing Substances. Unlike the Major League Joint DPT Program,
which has threshold levels for a positive test for Stimulants,27 2 the Minor
League DPT Program and the Latin Summer League DPT Program
trigger a positive test if any Performance Enhancing Substance is present
in the sample, apparently no matter how small the amount.273 This lack of
any tolerance underscores how rigorous these two Programs are, which
heightens the importance of transparency, clarity, and education of
269 Latin Summer League DPT Program, supra note 44, at Addendum B C
(Authorization for the Release of Treatment History for Treatment Purposes and
Authorization for the Release of Treatment History to Club Management).
270 Uniform Minor League Player Contract, Parents or Guardians Consent, available at
http://monstermac.princeton.edu/proguide/minorleaguecontract. html.
271 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at Addendum A; Latin Summer
League DPT Program, supra note 44, at Addendum A.
272 Major League Joint DPT Program (2006), supra note 27, at Addendum A.
273 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at Addendum A; Latin Summer
League DPT Program, supra note 44, at Addendum A.
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players affected by them. As analyzed earlier, concerns exist about
MLB's performance on precisely these issues with respect to Latin minor
league players.
7. Notification of Positive Test Results
The process by which a player learns whether he has tested
positive for a Prohibited Substance is almost identical in the Minor
League and the Latin Summer League DPT Programs. 74 Under the Latin
Summer League DPT Program, for Drugs of Abuse, MLHPAC must
immediately notify the team's General Manager, Farm Director, and
EAP of a player's positive test result, the date of collection, and the
substance for which the player tested positive. 7 5 Then, "the Office of the
Commissioner's Venezuelan-based EAP shall be responsible for
informing the Player of the positive test result., 276 This provision is odd
because the Latin Summer League DPT Program defines an EAP as the
"Employee Assistance Programs" of teams and not of the MLB
Commissioner's Office.277 In the Minor League DPT Program, the EAP
of the team informs the player of the positive test for a Drug of Abuse. 78
Who or what is the MLB Commissioner's EAP is not defined in the
Latin Summer League DPT Program.
The confusion continues in the next provision of notification for
positive results for Drugs of Abuse: "If a Player tests positive for a
second time, MLHPAC shall notify the Club's General Manager, Farm
Director and the Venezuelan-based EAP of the discipline and the
General Manager or Farm Director shall be responsible for disclosing
this information to the Player., 279 Is the "Venezuelan-based EAP" in this
provision the MLB Commissioner's or the team's EAP?
274 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 6-7; Latin Summer League
DPT Program, supra note 44, at 6.
275 Latin Summer League DPT Program, supra note 44, at 6.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 1.
278 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 6.
279 Latin Summer League DPT Program, supra note 44, at 6. The reference to
only a Venezuelan-based EAP in this provision is a reminder that MLB only
fully applies the Latin Summer League DPT Program presently in Venezuela
not the Dominican Republic, as discussed supra notes 227-228 and accom-
panying text and infra notes 290-294 and accompanying text.
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The EAP confusion gets worse in the provisions on notification
of positive results for Performance Enhancing Substances. For such
results, MLHPAC must immediately notify the team's General Manager
and Farm Director of a player's positive result, the date of collection, the
substance for which the player tested positive, and the discipline being
imposed.280 Then, the team's "General Manager and/or Farm Director
may, at his discretion inform the EAP of such positive test result.,
281
Even more confusingly, the provision continues: "The Club's Venezu-
elan-based EAP shall be responsible for informing the Player of the
positive test result and the discipline imposed., 282 The provision never
states that some entity, such as the MLHPAC or the team's General
Manager, must inform the Venezuelan-based EAP of the positive test
result so that this EAP can fulfill its obligation to inform the player.
This confusion crops up in very important provisions in the Latin
Summer League DPT Program concerning how the Program notifies a
player of a positive test. The complex and confusing notification provi-
sions perhaps help to explain why investigative reporting in Venezuela
has uncovered instances of players learning of their positive tests in ways
not prescribed by the rules.283 The chain of communication is particularly
important because the Latin Summer League DPT Program requires that
information on the player's positive test remain confidential, especially
until the player's rights of appeal have been exhausted.284 The chain of
communication is also critical for informing the player of his rights to
appeal and how to appeal a positive test.
Stepping back from the confusion helps provide a sense of the
unnecessary complexity the Latin Summer League DPT Program con-
tains on notification of positive test results. Figures 1 and 2 map the
chain of communication in the notification processes for positive results
for Drugs of Abuse and Performance Enhancing Substances in the Latin
Summer League DPT Program. As the Figures illustrate, these notifica-
tion processes are unduly complicated and should be simplified in a way
that maximizes the rapidity of communication to the player and the




283 Baker, Growing Pains, supra note 43.
284 Latin Summer League DPT Program, supra note 44, at 8.
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Figure 1. Notification of Positive Test Results for Drugs of Abuse
Figure 2. Notification of Positive Test Results for Performance
Enhancing Drugs
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8. Sanctions for Violating the Drug-Testing Program
The Minor League DPT Program and the Latin Summer League
DPT Program impose the same sanctions for violations of their respec-
tive rules. 215 See Table 12. Although the sanctions are the same, the
impact of the sanctions is different for players participating at different
levels of the minor league system because of the varying number of
games played in a season. This disparate impact is described in Table 13.
Table 12. Sanctions for Violating Drug-Testing Program
Offenses Failure to Positive Test for Positive Test for
Comply with Drug of Abuse Performance
Treatment Enhancing
Programs Substance
First 50-game Enters 50-game
suspension Administrative suspension
Track and placed in
treatment program
Second 100-game 50-game suspension 100-game
suspension suspension




211 Until the 2006 season, the Minor League DPT Program had less severe
sanctions than the Latin Summer League DPT Program, namely a 15-game
suspension for a first violation (rather than the 50-game suspension in the Latin
Summer League) and a 30-game suspension for a second violation (rather than a
100-game suspension in the Latin Summer League). Major League Baseball's
Minor League Drug Prevention and Treatment Program (2005) (on file with
authors), at 9 11. MLB increased the sanctions in the Minor League DPT
Program before the 2006 season so that it and the Latin Summer League DPT
Program have the same sanctions. Mark Thoma, 50-Game Bans 'for Cal
Leaguers, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, Apr. 18, 2006, http://www.pe.com/sports/
baseball/breakout/stories/PESportsLocal D suspensions_19.13232ff8.html.
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Table 13. Relative Impact of Sanctions on Different Parts of the
Minor League System
Minor League Number of Percentage of Percentage of
Games Per Season Lost from Season Lost
Season 286  50-Game from 100-Game
Suspension Suspension
AAA 144 34.7% 69.4%
AA (Eastern 142 35.2% 70.4%
League)
AA (Southern 140 35.7% 71.4%
League, Texas
League)
A-Advance 140 35.7% 71.4%
A 140 35.7% 71.4%
Short Class A 76 65.8% One entire season
+ 31.6% of the
next season
Rookie Advance 68 73.5% One entire season
(Appalachian + 42.1 % of the
League) next season
Rookie Advance 76 65.8% One entire season
(Pioneer + 31.6% of the
League) next season
Rookie (Arizona 56 89.3% One entire season
League) + 78.6% of the
next season
Rookie (Gulf 54 92.6% One entire season
Coast League) + 85.2% of the
next season
Dominican 70-72 71.4%-69.4% One entire season
Summer League + 42.9%-38.9%
of the next season
Venezuelan 60 83.3% One entire season
Summer League + 66.7% of the
next season
286 BASEBALL AMERICADIRECTORY 135, 143, 152, 159,165, 170, 176,181, 187,
194. 202. 209. 214. 219. 224. 289 (23rd ed.. 2006).
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Table 13 helps illustrate how serious the sanctions are for players
in the rookie leagues in the United States and in the Summer League in
Venezuela. As noted above and discussed more below, MLB claims that
it cannot impose these game-suspension sanctions on Dominican players
in the Dominican Summer League. The impact on Venezuelan players in
the Summer League is not disproportionate to players in the rookie
leagues in the United States. However, the severity of the sanctions
heightens the importance of transparency, clarity, and education in
operating both Programs. Sufficient concerns exist to indicate that MLB
could do a much better job making the Latin Summer League DPT
Program more transparent and clear to teams, scouts, players, their
parents, and buscones. The importance of transparent, clear, and compre-
hensive information is well understood in other sports affected by PEDs,
as the emphasis on these objectives by WADA illustrates.2 87 The more
severe the penalties, the more critical education, awareness, and process
become to effective and equitable anti-PED strategies.
A worrying anomaly in the sanctions context is the purported
inability of MLB to apply the game-suspension sanctions against
Dominican players in the Dominican Summer League. As noted above,
MLB claims that it cannot suspend the players because Dominican law
prohibits such suspensions. A number of people have challenged MLB's
reading of Dominican law, claiming that MLB's position is "non-
sense. ' 288 There seems to be no disagreement that MLB teams can
terminate a Dominican player's contract and release him for testing
positive for PED use. It seems odd that MLB teams would not be able to
impose the less severe penalty of suspension upon Dominican players.
117 WADA, World Anti-Doping Code, supra note 11, at 50; WADA, Model
Guidelines for Core Information/Education Programs to Prevent Doping in
Sport, supra note 261.
288 Farrey, supra note 45 (noting that Fernando Mateo of Hispanics Across
America called MLB's claim "nonsense'); Julio C. Malone, A Challenge to
Major League Baseball, HISPANIC LINK, Aug. 14, 2005, http://www.
hispaniclink.org/newsservice/columns/2005/4110e.htm (Dominican journalist
arguing that MLB's position is "juiced-up nonsense"); Baker, Life in Needle
Park, supra note 48 (reporting that Dr. Mauro Di Pasquale, a former University
of Toronto Professor and steroid expert, "scoffed at MLB's blaming of
Dominican law for not suspending players").
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Of course, this question is a question of Dominican law, and we
are not experts in Dominican law. However, our research suggests that
MLB's claims about Dominican law raise some important questions.
Dominican law allows employers to suspend employees "either by
mutual consent of the parties or due to one of the other causes expressly
provided by the Labor Code (Art. 51). , ,289 Article 51 of the Dominican
Labor Code provides that employment contracts can be suspended
through the mutual consent of the parties, which could be achieved
through provisions in the employment contract agreed to by the employer
and employee.2 90 Critics of MLB's stance on Dominican law have used
this reasoning. 9' In addition, Article 50 of the Dominican Labor Code
allows employment suspensions to be without pay.292
Thus, Dominican law appears to provide MLB with a way to
suspend Dominican players in the Dominican Summer League who
violate the Latin Summer League DPT Program. MLB's position may
hinge on the fact that the Uniform Minor League Player Contract, which
all minor league players sign, does not contain express clauses allowing
MLB teams to suspend players for violating the drug-testing program. 9 3
MLB may have received legal advice from Dominican lawyers opining
that, absent such express contractual clauses, MLB cannot suspend
Dominican players for violating the prohibitions on PED use.
The irony, of course, is that MLB unilaterally sets the terms of
the Uniform Minor League Player Contract. MLB could easily includeprovisions specific to suspensions for violating the drug policy and
maintain uniform contracts. Such provisions would apply to minor
league players signed in North America or Latin America now that MLB
289 Fabio J. Guzmfrn, An Overview of Dominican Labor Law §5.6, http://
drl .com/legal/business/Labor Law.pdf.
290 Codigo de Trabajo de la Repfiblica Dominicana (Ley 16 92), May 29, 1992,
Articulo 51 ("Son causas de suspensi6n de los efectos del contrato de trabajo: 1.
El mutuo consentimiento de las partes... ).
291 Farrey, supra note 45 (quoting Fernando Mateo arguing that "[t]he Domi-
nican government cannot impose themselves on a contract between an indivi-
dual and corporation. When these kids sign on a dotted line, they are under
contract with their firm.").
292 Codigo de Trabajo de la Repfiblica Dominicana, supra note 290, at Article
50.
293 Uniform Minor League Player Contract, supra note 270.
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has drug-testing policies in all its minor league operations. If this
analysis is correct, then MLB's position that it cannot suspend
Dominican players under Dominican law ingenuously tells only part of
the story. If this line of reasoning is accurate, why has MLB not moved
to remedy the discrepancy in enforcing the Latin Summer League DPT
Program in the Dominican Republic?
9. The Appeal Process
The appeal process in the Minor League DPT Program and the
Latin Summer League DPT Program are almost identical except in one
important area, the scope of the Therapeutic Use Exemption. Both
Programs limit the bases for a player's appeal of a positive test result to
three grounds: (1) the player has sufficient reason to believe that the
chain-of-custody of his sample was not properly administered pursuant
to Program requirements, which produced the erroneous test result; (2)
the player has sufficient reason to believe that the laboratory did not
properly administer the testing of the specimen, which resulted in an
erroneous test result; or (3) the player qualifies for a Therapeutic Use
Exemption (TUE).294 The 2007 version of the Minor League DPT
Program contains additional provisions related to the TUE that do not
appear in the 2006 version of the Latin Summer League DPT Program.295
As highlighted above,296 the first two bases for filing an appeal
seem nearly impossible for a minor league player, whether from the
United States or a Latin American country, to use. How is a Latin
teenager, with little education, no ability to speak English, and often no
agent to provide assistance, going to develop sufficient reasons to believe
that the transnational chain-of-custody of his sample was not properly
administered or that the laboratory in Kansas City, Missouri did not
properly test his specimen? Even though MLB applies the same rules to
minor league players in North America and Latin America, the particular
context of minor league baseball in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela makes these rules even more difficult for players in these
294 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 11; Latin Summer League
DPT Program, supra note 44, at 11 12.
295 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 12-14. These additional TUE
provisions include detailed instructions on applying for a TUE and for making a
TUE appeal. Id. at 13-14, Addendum F.
296 See supra notes 295-296 and accompanying text.
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countries to contemplate utilizing effectively. In effect, Latin minor
league players receive harsher treatment.
Similar harsh treatment occurs with respect to the process
through which players have to appeal a positive test result. The process
for appealing is nearly identical in the Minor League and the Latin Sum-
mer League DPT Programs,29 7 but, in this case, making the processes
virtually the same produces defacto discrimination. Earlier we described
the appeal process in the Minor League DPT Program,298 and the
application of this process to players in Latin America creates inequities
that MLB could eliminate in favor of a more effective process.
The Latin Summer League DPT Program requires children and
young men from Latin American countries to file a written appeal with
the MLB Commissioner's Office in New York within 48 hours of being
informed of a positive test result.2 99 This short period of time contrasts
with WADA's various model rules, which give athletes up to 21 days to
appeal positive test results. 30 0 The time period to file an appeal matters
because completing this task requires: (1) being informed properly of the
positive test result; (2) understanding the complex rules on appealing
positive results, especially the narrow bases for filing an appeal; (3)
having the ability of writing down cogently an appeal that would pass
muster under the rules; and (4) delivering this document to the MLB
Commissioner's Office in New York by overnight mail or fax. °30 In
addition, if the player wants his "B" sample tested to confirm his argu-
ment that the "A" sample was erroneously tested, the player has to pay
for such test in advance. °2 The player is also responsible for the costs
associated with his appeal if MLHPAC rejects it.303
297 Minor League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 12; Latin Summer League
DPT Program, supra note 44, at 12. The 2007 version of the Minor League DPT
Program contains additional instructions on submitting a TUE appeal that do not
appear in the 2006 version of the Latin American DPT Program. Minor League
DPT Program, supra note 31, at 12, Addendum F.
298 See supra notes 133 141 and accompanying text.
299 Latin Summer League DPT Program, supra note 31, at 12.
301 WADA, Models of Best Practice for International Federations (2003), at 29
(giving athletes 21 days to appeal a positive test result to the Court of Arbitra-
tion for Sports).
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As noted above in the overview of the Minor League DPT
Program,3 °4 MLB has designed the appeal process to be very difficult for
minor league players to use, even for minor league players who have the
assistance of an agent.3°5 For minor league players in Venezuela, the
appeal process is not impossible to utilize30 6 but it is unnecessarily ine-
quitable and unfair. Why minor league players in Latin America cannot
communicate appeals to someone or some entity connected to MLB in
their own countries is not clear beyond the fact that MLB has built no
institutional systems in these countries to handle such a responsibility.
Instead of making such country-level investments, MLB forces Latin
players, who often have no agents or legal representation, to maneuver
through a very difficult and non-independent appeal process located
entirely in New York City. The substantive bases for appealing positive
tests are so narrow and difficult to establish that they would prevent an
in-country appeals communication channel from producing an avalanche
of frivolous appeals.
Reporting on the problems with MLB's drug-testing program in
Venezuela also reveals a lack of understanding about the appeal process
on the part of players affected by positive test results. 30 7 Leaving aside
the difficulties of making appeals, MLB can, and should, do much more
to educate MLB teams and Latin players about the appeal process.
Accomplishing this objective will require something MLB has so far
been reluctant to do-invest more time and resources into educating
communities in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela affected by the
Latin Summer League DPT Program.
D. Concluding Thoughts on the Critical Analysis of the
Latin Summer League DPT Program
Our critical analysis of the Latin Summer League DPT Program
reveals many problems that create inequities and unfairness for players in
the Dominican Republic and Venezuela who are subject to its rules.
304 See supra notes 106 147 and accompanying text.
305 See, e.g., Masteralexis, supra note 149, at 786 87 (describing difficulties of
the appeal process for minor league players in the United States).
306 Baker, Growing Pains, supra note 43 (noting that Robert Manfred of the
MLB Commissioner's Office indicated that three appeals from Venezuela
players have been made).
307 Id.
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These problems begin with the one-sided, unilaterally imposed Minor
League DPT Program, which MLB developed for the minor leagues in
the United States and Canada but used as the template for its drug-testing
activities in Latin America. Changes that MLB made to the Minor
League DPT Program in applying it to Latin America have increased the
unfairness of MLB's unilateral approach to drug testing in the minor
leagues or added to this unfairness by creating rules that, in effect,
discriminate against Latin children and young men.
In the last part of this article, we make some recom-
mendations for how MLB can transform its drug-testing
program in Latin America into a more effective, fair, and
equitable tool. The way in which MLB has approached,
and continues to approach, the PED problem in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela is neither necessary
nor prudent. Whether MLB is serious about addressing
the PED problem in its Latin markets for baseball talent
hinges on its ability to revise its strategy and efforts in
ways that will improve not only the health of players but
also the integrity of the game of baseball.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING MLB's DRUG PREVENTION
AND TREATMENT PROGRAM IN LATIN AMERICA
In our prior efforts to encourage MLB to change the way it
approaches Latin minor league players, we developed five general and
interdependent principles to guide the reforms needed.308 These reform
principles are: democratization, centralization, harmonization, specializa-
tion, and implementation. We believe these principles provide useful
guidance with respect to the operation of MLB's drug prevention and
308 We have applied these general reform principles to proposals for a worldwide
draft and to MLB's proposed standards for baseball academies in the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela. See Letter from Arturo J. Marcano and David P. Fidler
on the Worldwide Draft Proposal to MLB Conmmissioner Allan H. (Bud) Selig
and MLBPA Executive Director Don Fehr (Sept. 9, 2002) (on file with authors);
Memorandum from Arturo J. Marcano and David P. Fidler on Preliminary
Analysis of "MLB Academy Standards and Compliance Inspection Procedure"
to Rafael Perez, MLB Commission's Office, Dominican Republic (Jan. 17,
2003) (on file with authors).
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treatment program in Latin America. In this part, we apply these
principles to this program in an effort to recommend constructive
changes to the way in which MLB seeks to address the PED problem in
the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.
A. Democratization
A feature of MLB's behavior in connection with its minor league
operations has been a tendency not to involve interested parties in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela.3 °9 Concerning other problems with
MLB's behavior in Latin America, we urged MLB to seek more
significant input and participation from interested actors in the Domini-
can Republic and Venezuela. We call this effort to broaden the base of
local participation "democratization." The manner in which MLB set up
the Latin Summer League DPT Program is a classic example of MLB's
failure to integrate local stakeholders. The program fails to create a
formal role for interested organizations and individuals in the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela. MLB does not have one employee resident in
Venezuela assigned to handle any issue, let alone the Latin Summer
League DPT Program. The Program does not even officially create a role
for the MLB office in the Dominican Republic. All decisions concerning
Latin American minor league baseball are made entirely in New York
City and by U.S.-based employees or consultants of MLB. The labora-
tory that conducts the testing on samples from Latin minor league
players is in Kansas City, Missouri. Latin minor league players have to
communicate any issues with drug-testing directly to persons or entities
in the United States.
The lack of local involvement in the Latin Summer League DPT
Program stems partly from the fact that MLB simply applied the Minor
League DPT Program, which was developed for the minor leagues in the
United States and Canada, to the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.
MLB's failure to integrate Dominicans and Venezuelans systematically
into the Program reveals the reluctance of the MLB Commissioner's
Office to create sustainable and productive partnerships in Latin
American countries. PED use not only threatens the integrity of the game
of baseball but it also threatens the individual health of players and
309 A similar concern could be raised about MLB's approach to regulating drug-
testing in its North American minor league operations, but our focus is on the
minor league operations in Latin America.
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prospects, and the health of the overall population in these countries. The
Latin Summer League DPT Program could be a powerful engine for
creating synergies between governments, non-governmental organiza-
tions, private enterprises, schools, and community organizations, all of
which have an interest in curtailing the use of PEDs by children and
young men. Applying the reform principle of democratization would
allow MLB to reach out and build partnerships that could, collectively,
constitute a critical mass against the ever-present and dangerous temp-
tations to use PEDs.
As noted earlier, the governments of both the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela have signed the Copenhagen Declaration on
Anti-Doping in Sports. 310 Thus, MLB has an opportunity to work more
closely with the Dominican and Venezuelan governments to address the
PED problem. MLB outreach to schools, sports and community
organizations, and more high-profile involvement of Latin major league
players could deepen and broaden the anti-PED message that MLB
claims that it wants to spread. 311 As with many social problems in a
globalized world, leaders have to think globally but act locally.
Ultimately, individuals at the local level make the decision whether to
reject or use PEDs. MLB is wasting an opportunity to build a more
democratic approach to anti-doping in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela, which would benefit the health of children and young men,
the overall public health, improve the integrity of the game of baseball
from the local level through global level, and help fulfill MLB's social
responsibility in these Latin American countries.
B. Centralization
A second principle we have used to encourage reform in MLB's
activities in Latin America has been centralization. We applied this
310 WADA, Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sports: List of Signa-
tories, supra note 17.
311 See Merkin, supra note 62 (reporting on Venezuelan and Chicago White Sox
manager Ozzie Guillen's public service announcements warning of the dangers
of PED use); Geoff Baker, Challenging Drug Abuse; Jays' Batista Urges
Dominican Youngsters to Stay Off Juice, TORONTO STAR, May 24, 2005, at E06
(reporting on efforts of major leaguer Miguel Batista to encourage more collec-
tive effort by MLB, the Dominican government, and Dominican major league
players to fight PED use in the Dominican Republic).
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principle in situations in which MLB had not designed a central system
of regulation for its minor league activities in the Dominican Republic
and Venezuela. For example, until recently, MLB had no central set of
standards for baseball academies in these countries, even though
standards existed for minor league baseball facilities in the United States
and Canada. MLB's initial reaction to the public disclosure of the PED
problems in Latin America in 2003 was to cling to de-centralization
because it did not want to create a drug prevention and treatment
program for its minor league operations in Latin America. MLB's failure
to recognize its responsibility for PED use not only in the North
American minor league system but also in its Latin American operations
led to it being denounced for applying "double standards" that treated
Latin players in a callously discriminatory manner.
The creation of the Latin Summer League DPT Program in
response to outside pressure constituted MLB's attempt to create a
central regulatory system for PED use in its minor league operations in
both North and Latin America. The existence of the Latin Summer
League DPT Program suggests that MLB, however reluctantly, has
reformed its approach in a manner consistent with the principle of
centralization. The major problem under the centralization principle
involves the purported inability of MLB to suspend Dominican players
for testing positive for PEDs. This problem needs to be addressed in a
more forthright manner because it constitutes a serious weakness in
achieving a central regulatory approach that does not discriminate
against equally situated minor league players. As argued above, we, and
others, are skeptical of MLB's claim that Dominican law prohibits the
suspension of Dominican players who test positive for PEDs. Assuming
MLB is correct on the suspension issue, it should explore potential ways
to work with the Dominican government to make it possible for
sanctions to be applied. As a signatory to the Copenhagen Declaration on
Anti-Doping in Sports, the government of the Dominican Republic is
committed to taking serious actions against athletes who engage in
doping, including sanctions. More determined efforts on the part of MLB
to engage local constituencies in the Dominican Republic (as encouraged
by the democratization principle) would help build support for changing
Dominican law, should such legal reform actually be necessary.
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C. Harmonization
Much of our past work has involved efforts to try to get MLB to
accord Latin minor league players equivalent protections and treatment
as is provided for minor league players in the United States. For
example, standards regulating the quality of minor league training and
playing facilities should be the same. MLB's application of the Minor
League DPT Program, originally developed and only applied in North
America, to its Latin minor league operations would seem to correspond
with the harmonization reform principle. Many of our concerns with the
way the Minor League DPT Program applies in Latin America fall under
a different reform principle, specialization, which we look at below.
However, we do have problems with the manner in which MLB has
harmonized drug prevention and treatment programs across its minor
league operations in the United States and Latin America.
These problems arise from the substantive and procedural rules
found in the Minor League DPT Program. In other words, the underlying
rules being harmonized are flawed and need reforming. Earlier, this
article identified many concerns about the Minor League DPT Program
itself, especially its appeal process. Ultimately, these concerns arise
because MLB unilaterally established the rules and applied them to its
minor league operations in the United States and Canada with no input
from minor league players, who have no union to represent their interests
in negotiations with MLB. The creation of such a union is not likely, so
recommendations for reform under the harmonization principle have to
look elsewhere for guidance. For us, WADA's Anti-Doping Code and its
related international standards on the various aspects of anti-doping
programs provide MLB with an internationally recognized source of
strategies and approaches for improving the anti-PED effort throughout
MLB's minor league operations.312
In short, the harmonization reform principle calls for the
WADA-ization of MLB's drug prevention and treatment programs for its
minor league operations. This article has frequently compared aspects of
the Minor League and Latin Summer League DPT Programs to WADA
rules and standards. However, we have not, by any means, undertaken a
comprehensive comparative examination of MLB's approach against
312 See also Nafziger, supra note 4, at 208 (arguing for the importance of the
World Anti-Doping Code as an instrument of global anti-doping harmonization).
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WADA's guidance for international and national anti-doping efforts.
Such a comprehensive comparison should be undertaken, preferably,
through cooperation between the MLB Commissioner's Office, WADA,
and local stakeholders in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela.
Nearly 600 national and international sports organizations have
adopted the World Anti-Doping Code,313 and 191 countries 314 inclu-
ding the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela-have
recognized, through the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in
Sports, the World Anti-Doping Code as "the foundation in the world
fight against doping in sport." 315 Therefore, WADA's harmonization
efforts provide a strong foundation on which to reform MLB's approach
to its minor league operations in both the United States and Latin
America. MLB's track record working outside the WADA system is not
impressive, either at the major league or minor league level, as evidenced
by the PED crisis afflicting both levels of professional baseball.
MLBPA's influence in negotiations with MLB over the Major League
Joint DPT Program (2006) means that this Program is less amenable to
WADA-ization than the minor league program. MLB's total control over
the minor league drug prevention and treatment program creates the
opportunity to transform the minor league program collaboratively into a
harmonized system based on the international standards developed by
WADA and adopted universally by many sports organizations.
Using WADA as a guide for harmonization does not guarantee
that MLB can completely prevent PED use. Other global sports, such a
professional cycling, utilize the World Anti-Doping Code and still
experience serious problem with doping by athletes.316 The application of
the substantive and procedural rules in the World Anti-Doping Code has
been challenged in high-profile cases, such as the one involving cyclist
313 WADA, World Anti-Doping Code: Code Acceptance, http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/dynamic.ch2?pageCategory.id-270.
314 WADA, Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sports: List of Signa-
tories, supra note 17.
315 Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sports, supra note 17, at §4.1.
316 See POUND, INSIDE DOPE: How DRUGS ARE THE BIGGEST THREAT TO
SPORTS, WHY YOU SHOULD CARE, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT THEM,
supra note 30 (analyzing the doping problems in contemporary global sports).
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and 2006 Tour de France winner Floyd Landis.317 No "magic bullet"
exists that will eliminate the pressures and attitudes that feed the tempta-
tion to use PEDs or the misuse of anti-doping rules and procedures by
sports organizations. WADA-based harmonization may also be severely
challenged in all sports by the development and use of increasingly
sophisticated and hard-to-detect performance-enhancing substances.
3 18
However, the global acceptance of the World Anti-Doping Code by
sports organizations, and the support governments and international
organizations have provided the Code in the form of the Copenhagen
Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sports and the UNESCO International
Convention Against Doping in Sports, demonstrate the importance of the
Code in the next generation of anti-doping efforts in global sports,
including MLB.
D. Specialization
Although harmonization is an important strategic objective, we
have in past work on MLB's minor league operations in Latin America
stressed the need to adapt the rules to meet the particular circumstances
of minor league baseball in the Dominican Republic and Venezuela. Our
earlier analysis of the critical importance of understanding the poverty
problem, MLB's recruiting interests in children, the problems caused by
buscones, and the different and weaker pharmaceutical regulatory
systems connect directly to the specialization reform principle. Even if
subjected to WADA-ization, the Minor League DPT Program has to be
3 17 See FLOYD LANDIS & LOREN MOONEY, POSITIVELY FALSE: THE REAL STORY
OF How I WON THE TOUR DE FRANCE (2007). According to Landis' web site,
this book "delivers a powerful indictment of the unchecked governing bodies of
cycling and the Olympic Games that place the bureaucratic ambitions of a few
over the integrity of sport as a whole. He describes the inner workings of the
cycling world a place with no union or bargaining power where the athletes are
subject to the upside-down world of anti-doping, replete with antiquated science,
flawed interpretive protocols and a draconian legal process."). Floydlandis.com,
"Positively False: The Real Story of How I Won the Tour de France" Officially
on Sale Today, June 26, 2007, http://www.floydlandis.com/blog/ (last visited
Sept. 4, 2007).
318 Nafziger, supra note 4, at 208 ("The new specter of undetectable or difficult-
to-detect doping, highlighted by the BALCO controversy in the United States,
serves as a reminder that we have entered a Brave New World of doping and
doping control in sports.").
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adjusted or supplemented to account for the conditions of Latin America
in order to produce an effective and sustainable anti-PED effort. 19
MLB has to acknowledge that the context of poverty and the
recruitment of children in poverty make anti-doping efforts in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela different from similar efforts in the
North American minor leagues. This acknowledgment must involve a
much more sincere and serious approach to the social responsibilities
MLB and MLB teams face in these countries. MLB's past behavior in
these countries does not inspire confidence that the MLB Commis-
sioner's Office even understands why social responsibility should be a
strategic component of its activities in Latin America. In the context of
PEDs, MLB's constant refrain that it bears no responsibility for the
adverse effects of the buscon system is evidence of the willful blindness
and lack of leadership in the Commissioner's Office. In our nearly ten
years of working to try to improve MLB's behavior in Latin America, we
have not seen one instance in which the Commissioner's Office made
any changes, except when confronted with significant external criticism
and pressure. Unfortunately, the same dynamic has played out in the
PED context at the major league level. It effectively took threats from
Congress to get MLB and the MLBPA to agree to confront seriously
doping by major league players, and it took outside intervention, which
included the Governor of the State of New York, to prod MLB toward
applying drug-testing regulations in its Latin minor league operations.
Operationalizing the specialization principle can connect with
the democratization principle because tailoring a drug prevention and
treatment program for the context in which MLB's Latin minor leagues
operate requires local involvement and input. As argued earlier in the
article, MLB can take steps to minimize the incentives that buscones
have to "juice" prospects for minor league contracts, and taking these
steps would be an example of how MLB could apply the specialization
reform principle. Even with taking these steps, effective regulation of
buscones would have to involve local actions coordinated with MLB,
which has tremendous power to facilitate and support local activism.
319 Nafziger points out that the World Anti-Doping Code "despite its theme of
harmonization, does not require anti-doping organizations to adopt a single
results management and hearing process. Each signatory organization can design
it own process so long as it satisfies the Code's general requirements." Id. at
205-206.
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Rather than constantly trying to wash its hands of any culpability for the
negative externalities caused by buscones, MLB can apply the speciali-
zation and democratization reform principles to help the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela mitigate and perhaps eliminate these negative
externalities.
E. Implementation
The final principle for reform is implementation. In the past,
MLB has established rules, such as the 17-year-old rule, only to fail to
implement and enforce them effectively. 320 This article has argued that
MLB has failed, and continues to fail, to implement a drug prevention
and treatment program effectively in the Dominican Republic and
Venezuela. The implementation failure stems mainly from MLB's poorly
executed efforts to educate and inform Latin minor league players about
the Minor League DPT Program and the Latin Summer League DPT
Program. MLB argues that it has committed serious resources to the
educational campaign, claiming that it is has spent "literally millions of
dollars" on education in the Dominican Republic alone. We do not
believe this claim is credible for the reasons analyzed above, but, even if
it was true the statistical evidence concerning positive tests among minor
league players indicates that those millions of dollars have not been
effectively spent.
For us, the implementation and specialization reform principles
converge to help point MLB in directions it should consider. In our view,
MLB must invest in building a proper infrastructure to manage and
oversee a drug prevention and treatment program in both the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela. At the moment, MLB has a grand total of two
professional staff members resident in the Dominican Republic (and
none in Venezuela) tasked with dealing with all issues related to MLB's
two biggest sources of foreign baseball talent. MLB has more
professional staff stationed in its office in London, which is essentially
an office that markets MLB in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.
These regions collectively contributed 0 players to the major leagues in
320 See MARCANO & FIDLER, STEALING LIVES, supra note 80, at 31-36
(analyzing the problems with MLB's 17-year-old rule).
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2007.321 The particular context of minor league baseball in the
Dominican Republic and Venezuela demands that MLB create a more
robust institutional presence and commitment than it has, to date,
believed necessary. Otherwise, implementation of anti-PED strategies
will continue to be superficial and haphazard, which will harm the health
and welfare of children and young men, overall public health, and the
integrity of the game of baseball. Experts, including the authors, have
blasted MLB's proclivity to get "Latin players on the cheap. 322 MLB
should avoid continuing to implement an anti-doping program in Latin
America "on the cheap."
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem of PEDs in professional sports promises to retain a
high profile for the foreseeable future. The issue has become too large
and controversial to ignore. Indeed, the White House has spearheaded an
effort to get the four major sports leagues in the United States, the U.S.
Olympic Committee, and the NCAA to cooperate and coordinate more
on their respective fights against doping.323 Barry Bonds' successful
pursuit of Hank Aaron's home run record kept the shadow of steroid use
hanging over MLB on almost a daily basis, and the report of former
Senator George Mitchell on how to address the PED problem in the
major leagues is eagerly anticipated by many concerned about the doping
crisis in MLB.
These high-profile developments, stories, and future reports will,
in all likelihood, dwell on the highest levels of professional sports and
will probably not address, in any significant way, the level of profes-
sional baseball on which this article focused. Whether continuing
321 Associated Press, National Pastime Takes on International Flavor, supra
note 225 (listing no players from these regions on major league rosters at the
beginning of the 2007 season).
322 Arturo J. Marcano & David P. Fidler, The Globalization of Baseball and the
Mistreatment of Latin American Baseball Talent, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 511,513 (1999); Samuel 0. Regalado, "Latin Players on the Cheap":
Professional Baseball Recruitment in Latin America and the Neocolonialist
Tradition, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9 (2000); MARCANO & FIDLER,
STEALING LIVES, supra note 80 at 30-3 1.
323 Associated Press, Leaders Fight Problem of Performance-Enhancing Drugs,
ESPN, May 15, 2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id-2870644.
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scandals and controversies in the major leagues will have a trickle-down
effect on the PED problem in the minor leagues remains to be seen.
Other changes may affect the future trajectory of anti-PED efforts in
MLB's Latin minor league operations. For example, in December 2006,
Congress changed U.S. immigration laws in a way that allows MLB
teams to bring more foreign minor league players to the United States.
24
According to MLB vice president Ed Burns, previous immigration law
set limits on the number of foreign minor league players MLB teams
could bring to the United States, and Burns estimated that these limits
prevented MLB teams from bringing an extra 350 players to the United
States in 2004 and 2005, most of which had to remain in the Dominican
and Venezuelan minor league systems.325
However, the continued flow of players to the U.S. minor
leagues from Venezuela has been a source of concern because of rumors
and discussions revolving around plans for the Venezuelan government
to regulate MLB teams' operations more tightly.3 26 These concerns
combine with existing problems for MLB teams in Venezuela, which
have meant that "almost half the U.S. clubs that once had training
academies in the country have abandoned them in recent years, driven
away by rampant crime and political instability. '" 327 MLB officials held
meetings with Venezuelan government officials in March 2007 to
discuss the matter, and the Venezuelan Minister of Sport indicated that
the government wants to work with MLB to improve the operations and
conditions of MLB teams' academies. The Venezuelan government is
especially interested in the process of signing players, training players,
providing medical assistance, and other things related to the lives of the
324 Creating Opportunities for Minor League Professionals, Entertainers, and
Teams through Legal Entry Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-463, 120 Stat. 3477
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
325 Frederic J. Frommer, New Law Benefits Foreign Minor Leaguers, SEATTLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 15, 2006, http://seattlepi.newsource.comlother
sports/2080APSports Visas.html. See also J.J. Cooper & Chris Kline, New
Law Should Eliminate Visa Issues, BASEBALL AMERICA, Dec. 13, 2006, http://
www.baseballamerica.com/today/minors/news/262999.html.
326 Jeff Eisenberg, Instability in Venezuela Could Threaten Flow of Baseball
Talent to U.S., THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE, May 20, 2007, http://www.pe.com/
sports/breakout/stories/PENews Local S venezuelan baseball.3faf5b2.html.
327 Id.
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players.3 28 Given the impact of the Latin Summer League DPT Program
on Venezuelan players, MLB's efforts on drug testing could well be on
this list of items MLB and the Venezuelan government may discuss.
Although reassured by the March 2007 meeting, many involved in MLB
remain worried about Venezuela because of "the volatility of [President
Hugo] Chavez, the unapologetic face of a rising tide of anti-American
sentiment in Latin America," and so major league executives "peruse
Venezuelan newspapers, scan U.S. State Department reports, chat with
scouts stationed in Latin America or travel there themselves, all in hopes
of finding a harbinger of which direction things will go."
329
How the change in U.S. immigration law and potential changes
in Venezuelan policy will affect the dynamics of minor league baseball
in the United States, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela is not yet
clear. To be sure, if MLB teams take advantage of the new U.S.
immigration law, more Latin minor league players will play in the United
States, and thus, will be subject to the Minor League DPT Program. For
us, this potentiality underscores the need to reform the Minor League
DPT Program, as discussed above, to address the situation of Latin
players. The transition to having more Latin minor league players in the
North American minor league system can be positively affected by a
better and more effective campaign against PEDs in the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela. In short, the change in the U.S. immigration
law highlights the necessity to look systemically at the anti-PED effort
for minor league baseball because the effort really applies to a single,
interdependent, and transnational system of labor recruiting, training, and
performance.
In this sense, MLB has the opportunity to put itself on the cutting
edge of global responses to the problem of doping in sports. MLB's
dismal responses to the PED problem in both the major and minor
leagues does not augur well for its ability to see this opportunity. With
sufficient prodding by those who are concerned about the threat doping
poses to athletes, public health, and the integrity of sports around the
world, MLB might shed its insular, non-transparent, discriminatory, and
328 YAHOO ! DEPORTES, Ministerio del Deporte de Venezuela y MLB firmardn
acuerdo de trabajo, Mar. 9, 2007, http://espanol.sports.yahoo.com/09032007/
54/deportes-ministerio-deporte-venezuela-mlb-firmar-n-acuerdo-trabaj o.html
(last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
329 Eisenberg, supra note 327.
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ineffective approaches to PED use and contribute to a more effective
global effort. MLB has a window of opportunity in which to turn itself
around in this area. Hopefully, some of the younger, more enlightened
leaders emerging in the system, who understand the good and the bad of
the globalization of baseball, can exert sufficient influence to transform
MLB from a pariah to a paragon in terms of the fight against PEDs in
professional baseball specifically and global sports generally.

